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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last fifty years, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has become a 
fixture of the conflict resolution landscape.1  As its label suggests, ADR is gener-
ally viewed as an alternative to adjudication, developed in response to litigations 
liabilitiesits expense, delay, adversarialism, and limits as a tool for addressing 
complex problems.  In contrast, ADRs value rests in its capacity to produce 
prompt, fair, and efficient resolutions that satisfy the disputants.2 
ADR proponents and critics alike presuppose that the benefits of ADR are 
achieved at inevitable costs.  The assumption is that informal conflict resolution 
necessarily resolves disputes for the disputants and no one else.3  It does so by 
satisfying the interests of those involved in the immediate conflict, often under 
guarantees of confidentiality.  As a result, it is argued, ADR does not and cannot 
generate values or solutions that can apply beyond the scope of the particular dis-
pute.4  In this sense, it is assumed that informal conflict resolution is necessarily 
non-normative, and that it cannot yield more general public values or solutions to 
problems affecting more than the individual disputants.5 
The confidentiality of ADR gives rise to a second perceived cost: lack of ac-
countability.  Confidentiality insulates the particulars of the dispute resolution 
___________________________  
 1. DAVID B. LIPSKY, RONALD L. SEEBER & RICHARD D. FINCHER, EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR 
MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT 5  (2003); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA P. LOVE, ANDREA K. 
SCHNEIDER & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADJUDICATIVE MODEL 
(2005).  
 2. See WILLIAM URY, JEANNE BRETT & STEPHEN GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: 
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 43 44 (1989); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a 
Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 277 (1982); Dockson, R.R, Justice in the balance 2020: Report of the 
Commission on the Future of the California Courts. San Francisco: Supreme Court of California 40 
41 (1993); Lauren B. Edelman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational 
Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 941, 950 (1999); Howard Gadlin, The Ombudsman: 
Whats in a Name?, 16 NEGOT. J. 37, 42 (2000) [hereinafter Gadlin, Whats in a Name?]; Carrie Men-
kel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In 
Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2664 n.9 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute].  
 3. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); Susan Silbey & Austin 
Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to Reconstruc-
tion of the Juridical Subject, 66 DEN. L. REV. 437, 491 (1989). 
 4. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION (2000); Fiss, supra note 3, at 108586; Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New 
Market for Disputes: A Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. L. POL. & 
SOC'Y 367, 383 (1992); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2619, 262226 (1995). 
 5. See Kenneth Abraham, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355 (2002); Fiss, 
supra note 3, at 1085; Luban, supra note 4, at 263940.   
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process and outcome from public scrutiny.6  If ADR cannot, consistent with the 
confidentiality requirement, include the opportunity for outside review, it is 
widely assumed that the process inevitability lacks any check on decision-maker 
bias.7  Confidentiality is also seen to preclude holding ADR accountable in rela-
tion to any standards other than the efficiency of the process and the satisfaction 
of the disputants.8 
These two assumptions about ADRits inability to elaborate public values 
and its unaccountabilitylie at the heart of the ADR critique.  This critique typi-
cally contrasts the limitations of ADR with the countervailing virtues of adjudica-
tion as the paradigmatic form of norm elaboration and accountability.9  Adjudica-
tion elaborates public norms by developing binding precedents in a particular 
case, which will then apply in the future to comparable cases.  It achieves ac-
countability by providing for public access and appellate review.  ADRs critics 
and supporters presume that adjudications method of elaborating public norms 
and providing accountability constitutes the preferred, if not the only way that 
these rule-of-law values can be achieved.10 
This article suggests that the view of public norm elaboration and account-
ability underlying the critique of ADR is too narrow and needs to be rethought.  
Public norms do not consist only of the precedents developed and applied by 
courts or other adjudicative bodies.  They also emerge when relevant institutional 
actors develop values or remedies through an accountable process of principled 
and participatory decision making, and then adapt these values and remedies to 
broader groups or situations.  ADR can play a significant role in developing le-
gitimate and effective solutions to common problems and, in the process, produce 
generalizable norms. 
We argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom and practice, ADRs capac-
ity to generate accountable public norms stems from the linkage of individual and 
systemic conflict resolution.11  Conflict resolution systems often segregate indi-
vidual casework from systemic interventions aimed at addressing policy issues, 
examining recurring problems, or redesigning organizational systems.  We dem-
___________________________  
 6. American Bar Association, Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices 7 
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/115.pdf [hereinafter ABA Standards] 
(establishing confidentiality as an essential characteristic of an ombuds office).  
 7. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 136 (1983); see generally Richard Delgado, 
Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the 
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (discussing the possibil-
ity that ADR may incorporate racial and ethnic bias); Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process 
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (arguing that gendered power dynamics may permeate the 
mediation process) (1991). 
 8. AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 136; Abraham, supra note 5, at 36667; Luban, supra note 4, at 
264849.   
 9. See Fiss, supra note 3, at 1085; Luban, supra note 4, at 2635 n.71.  
 10. But see Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 2, at 2674, 269293 (discussing the poten-
tial for settlements to promote justice and elaborate norms). 
 11. See infra Section III.  Our emphasis on linkage of adjudication and informal conflict resolution, 
rather than their integration into a unitary system, distinguishes our approach from that taken in a 
series of articles by Richard Reuben. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary 
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 956 (2000) 
(arguing for a unified system of public justice in which trial, arbitration, mediation, evaluative tech-
niques, and other forms of ADR all operate toward the single end of binding public civil dispute reso-
lution.).   
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onstrate the value of integrating (but not merging) systemic thinking into individ-
ual casework, and individual cases into the project of understanding and address-
ing systemic concerns.  The linchpin of our approach is a form of root cause 
analysis, which enables intermediaries to identify and, where possible, address 
underlying problems as part of individual case work.  We document this novel 
form of conflict resolution that begins by attending to individual cases, but pro-
ceeds through a critical methodology to produce systemic interventions advancing 
public values.  We demonstrate that, under certain circumstances, informal con-
flict resolution can produce systemic changes that adjudication cannot achieve, 
and can thus solve public problems and generate public values.  Indeed, we argue 
that, in some situations, effective individual conflict resolution depends upon its 
linkage to systemic problem solving. 
The methodologies used to link individual and systemic conflict resolution 
also provide a kind of accountability presumed to be unavailable without appellate 
review.  We question the conventional assumption that detached neutrality is the 
only, or even the best, way to achieve impartiality and reduce the expression of 
bias.  We introduce the idea of multi-partialitycritically analyzing a conflict 
from multiple vantage pointsas a way to check the inevitable biases in decision 
making that must be continually surfaced and corrected. 12  Multi-partiality can be 
achieved through institutional design that builds in participatory accountability
ongoing examination and justification to participants and a community of practi-
tioners.  This reflective practice, if institutionalized, provides a check on conflict 
resolvers biases by requiring conflict resolvers to subject their analysis to the 
scrutiny of their peers and to explain and justify their choices as part of doing their 
work.  It also provides a way to learn from and build on experience. 
These ideas developed through a process of reflective inquiry very much like 
the conflict resolution processes we propose.  Susan Sturms earlier article on 
second generation employment discrimination documents examples of conflict 
resolution systems that track data about complaint patterns over time and create 
intermediary roles enabling organizations to use this information for systemic 
problem solving.13  As a result of this research, Susan Sturm was invited to work 
with the Center for Cooperative Resolution/Office of the Ombudsman (CCR) at 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) by Director and Ombudsman Howard 
Gadlin. 14  CCR is a comprehensive conflict resolution program located within 
NIH, a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services.  
From its inception, the office has explored the degree to which it could address 
___________________________  
 12. See Mary Wilkinson, How Do We Understand Empathy Systematically?, 14 J. FAM. THERAPY 
193, 199 (1992) (citing Harlene Anderson & Harold A. Goolishian, Human Systems as Linguistic 
Systems: Preliminary and Evolving Ideas about the Implications for Clinical Theory, 27 FAM. 
PROCESS 371, 37285 (1988)). 
 13. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. LAW. REV. 458, 499500 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second Generation]. 
 14. As part of their monthly Journal Club meeting, at which the staff discusses articles relevant to 
their work, CCR read Susans article on Second Generation Employment Discrimination, which intro-
duced the idea of conflict resolution as a means of systemic problem solving. Id at 499509.  Howard 
then came to Susans class at Columbia Law School on the Theory and Practice of Workplace Equity, 
and there Howard faced a series of questions about the ways he was or was not addressing structural 
issues in his role.  This prompted Howard to bring these questions back to the staff, and they invited 
Susan to help them think through the structural dimensions of their work.   
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systemic issues and still remain true to the ombuds responsibility to address dis-
crete conflicts.  CCR defined its work in a way that challenged the dichotomies 
currently framing the conflict resolution debate. 
We decided to work together in an effort to deepen understanding of the rela-
tionship of conflict resolution to systemic change.  Susan structured a process of 
participatory inquiry to examine the working theories and strategies used to link 
individual conflict resolution and systemic problem solving.  We began by collec-
tively establishing a set of goals for our work, which included developing a vo-
cabulary to analyze the relationship between individual and systemic problems, as 
well as improving our understanding of how and under what circumstances con-
flict resolution could produce systemic change.  We were interested in providing 
conceptual frameworks and strategies for moving from the individual to the sys-
temic and back. 
We then held a series of meetings during which Susan asked the ombudsmen 
to identify current issues or cases they saw as structural or systemic, and then to 
work through how they learned about those problems, what type of information 
they used to develop their understanding of the problem over time, what led them 
to view those problems as structural or systemic, what they did to address those 
problems, and how they assessed their intervention.  She also asked them to con-
trast those cases with those they identified as non-structural.  We collaboratively 
developed a structural intervention log, which was used to varying degrees by the 
staff to track the cases that they identified as structural or systemic.  Susan and her 
students also had a series of conversations with individual ombudsmen about their 
work.  Over a period of about a year, we observed and debriefed forty case review 
sessions.15  In addition, Susan participated in three retreats, two of which also 
included Ken Kressel, a conflict resolution scholar who was doing reflective prac-
tice work with CCR.  Through this intensive back-and-forth between intervention 
theories and practical consequences, our inquiry coalesced into a framework for 
using conflict resolution to fairly and effectively address individual problems, and 
simultaneously to develop knowledge about and occasions to intervene at a more 
systemic level.16 
This article presents the fruits of that collaboration.  It mines those lessons in 
aggregating knowledge from individual cases and prompting structural change, 
and considers the implications of this analysis for the design of informal conflict 
resolution systems.  It provides a concrete setting to test the possibilities for inter-
___________________________  
 15. Over the course of this project, Orna Rabinowich-Einy, Alexandra Marchosky, and Jennifer 
Kronick, who were students in Susans Workplace Equity Seminar, performed important roles as co-
researchers.  They conducted interviews, attended group sessions and retreats, observed case reviews, 
and wrote up their observations.  
 16. Several constraints have operated during this research, many of which mirror some of the con-
straints under which the conflict resolution itself takes place.  CCR operates under confidentiality 
requirements.  As a result, the research was limited to observations and discussions with the CCR staff, 
conducted in a format that preserved the confidentiality of disputants or that were not bound by confi-
dentiality.  Researchers were not able to survey, observe, or interview anyone outside CCR about their 
involvement in particular cases handled by the office.  CCR does not retain records revealing the 
identity or progress of particular cases once a dispute is resolved.  The analysis in this article is based 
on meetings, discussions, and group work with CCR.  No information that would reveal the identity of 
particular disputants or NIH employees was disclosed and none could be used in reporting this re-
search.  
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vention that advance public values and still preserve the capacity to afford indi-
vidual justice.  This inquiry also yielded new understandings of the meaning of 
impartiality, accountability, and public values. 
The article proceeds in five parts.  Section I defines the meaning of individual 
and systemic conflict, and then documents and critiques the conventional practice 
of separating them.  Section II develops a matrix to map the dynamic relationship 
between individual and systemic analysis and intervention, and then applies that 
framework to particular examples.  Drawing on case analyses, this section illus-
trates the interdependence of individual and systemic work, the methodologies 
used to link them, and the resulting synergies. 
In Section III, the article considers the implications of this framework for 
conflict resolution and theories of law.  We extrapolate from CCRs work in order 
to identify the elements of a conflict resolution program that can perform the role 
of integrating conflict resolution and systemic change.  Through examples, we 
show that conflict resolution programs with these features may be found within 
the court system and administrative agencies, as well as in new institutions operat-
ing within organizations or service delivery systems.  This section also discusses 
potential role conflicts created by the linkage and how they can be minimized.  
Finally, in Section IV, the matrix analysis is used to generate new theoretical un-
derstandings about conflict resolution and its relationship to rule-of-law values.  
We suggest that the CCR case study does more than raise questions about the 
assumptions underlying the traditional debate about conflict resolution.  It offers a 
reconceptualization, or at least an expanded understanding, of core rule-of-law 
values, such as impartiality, principled decision making, generalizability, and 
accountability.  Non-adjudicative conflict resolution can, under certain circum-
stances and institutional arrangements, embody rule-of-law principles and gener-
ate institutional practices advancing public values and addressing issues of com-
mon concern.  We use this analysis to reconsider the relationship between adjudi-
cative and non-adjudicative forms of conflict resolution. 
II.  THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH: SEPARATING INDIVIDUAL AND 
SYSTEMIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION  
Dispute resolution scholarship and practice frequently assign different ap-
proaches, and even different conflict resolution systems, to individual and sys-
temic problems.  This section first defines individual as compared to systemic 
conflict resolution. It then documents the tendency to separate these two forms in 
conflict resolution practice and scholarship, and offers reasons to question the 
desirability of this separation. 
A.  Defining Individual and Systemic Conflict 
Much conflict resolution work originates as issues or problems between spe-
cific people.  Often, parties will describe an issue as a dispute between individu-
als, and that designation determines the scope of the analysis and intervention for 
many forms of conflict resolution.  However, many problems presented initially as 
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personal or individual issues turn out to be rooted in policies, organizational prac-
tices, or systems affecting broader groups.17 
Of course, in some sense, every conflict or problem is systemic.  Every indi-
vidual operates in the context of a systema psychodynamic system, a family 
system, a work group, etc.  As used here, however, systemic defines how prob-
lems are understood for purposes of intervention at the appropriate level.  This 
goal justifies a more targeted distinction between individual and systemic cases, 
one that limits the definition of systemic to problems that are amenable to 
analysis and intervention within the context of the organization or the domains 
over which the organization has influence, where the source can be located, at 
least in part, in organizational rules, practices, decisions, or norms.   
When considered in relation to the project of intervention, individual cases 
can be defined as conflicts between direct disputants involving personal issues 
that do not involve others or implicate public values.  They are essentially self-
contained problems particular to the parties in a conflict or dispute.  People other 
than those directly involved do not affect and are not affected by the conflict or its 
resolution.  Individual conflicts can be addressed on their own terms without con-
sidering more general concerns or the implications of those cases for public val-
ues. 
Individual disputes are contrasted with conflicts involving conditions, prac-
tices, or values that matter to people beyond those directly involved in a dispute.  
These kinds of conflicts are systemic, in the sense that they cannot be fully under-
stood or addressed within the parameters of the conflict among the primary par-
ties.  The underlying source is located outside the problem as it is presented by the 
parties.  Systemic problems often involve actors who are not involved in the im-
mediate conflict as initially framed.  The problems they reveal could be connected 
to a broader set of goals that affect how the problem can be addressed.  They fre-
quently involve issues or values of more general concern.  These are often recur-
ring problems because routines or practices create the conditions making the dys-
function more likely.   
Some scholars label systemic problems as structural, based on the observa-
tion that many conflicts are rooted in conditions sustained by institutional prac-
tices.  However, this term seemed less fitting here because some problems of gen-
eral concern may not be actually rooted in structure.  This article also does not use 
the label public to refer to disputes implicating problems and values of general 
concern because this term carries different meanings for different constituencies.  
Lawyers tend to equate public with government involvement,18 but conflicts 
may implicate more general values and conditions without necessarily involving 
judicial or legislative requirements.  Indeed, part of this project involves providing 
___________________________  
 17. See JAMSHID GHARAJADEGHI, SYSTEMS THINKING, SECOND EDITION: MANAGING CHAOS AND 
COMPLEXITY: A PLATFORM FOR DESIGNING BUSINESS ARCHITECTURE (2005); Wendell Jones, Com-
plex Adaptive Systems, Beyond Intractability (Guy Burgess & Heidi Burgess eds., 2003), available at 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/complex_adaptive_systems/; John Paul MacDuffie, The 
Road to Root Cause: Shop-Floor Problem-Solving at Three Auto Assembly Plants, 43 MGMT. SCI. 
479, 494 (1997).   
 18. See, e.g,. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1297 (1976); Fiss, supra note 3, at 1089. 
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greater understanding of the relationship between informal conflict resolution and 
the generation of public norms. 
B.  The Tendency to Separate Individual and Systemic Problems 
Many conflict resolution systems rely on disputants to determine the scope of 
the conflict and the resulting intervention.  These systems pose a choice up front 
between addressing a problem as a discrete, individual dispute involving only the 
participants, or as a systemic issue.  Analysis and intervention occur on either the 
individual or the systemic level, rather than on the interaction between the two. 
Mediation, which is the most common form of ADR, often exemplifies this 
tendency.19  Mediation programs are designed to provide a voluntary and partici-
patory process for addressing disputes.20  They involve a third party who assists 
disputants in finding a solution of their own.21  Typically, mediations methodolo-
gies, roles, and relationships are geared toward reaching successful outcomes in 
individual cases.22  The inquiry proceeds from disputants understanding of the 
problem and seeks a resolution based on the parties interests.  Success is often 
evaluated in terms of prompt resolution, party satisfaction, improvement of the 
disputants relationship over time, and cost-effectiveness.23  Each case is resolved 
on its own terms, detached from the organizational or systemic dynamics impli-
cated by its occurrence.  The preference, in fact, is to use outside mediators who 
have no ongoing relationship with the organization or knowledge of the particular 
context, thus providing a neutral perspective.24 
In general, mediation programs are not designed to connect resolving individ-
ual cases with identifying and addressing systemic concerns or problems.  Unless 
systemic issues are the focus of the dispute as framed by the parties to a media-
tion, they remain off the table and are taken as constraints within which the me-
diation proceeds.  For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) has been found to address disputes on a case-by-case basis and individu-
alize complaints.25  EEOC mediation is not consistently successful, often exacer-
___________________________  
 19. LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 8182 (reporting that mediation is the most fre-
quently used and preferred form of conflict resolution).  
 20. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971); 
MENKEL-MEADOW, LOVE, SCHNEIDER & STERNLIGHT, supra note 1, at 266. 
 21. Mediation offers the possibility of party-crafted solutions to problems, disputes, conflicts, 
transaction and relationships, which are facilitated by a third party with no authority to decide anything 
or to impose rules. MENKEL-MEADOW, LOVE, SCHNEIDER & STERNLIGHT, supra note 1, at 7. 
 22. There are important differences and disagreements among mediators about mediations goals, 
the role of the mediator, and the criteria for success.  Mediation could be facilitative, evaluative, or 
transformative. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165 (2003) 
(summarizing differences in these mediation strategies).  These strategies share a focus on individual 
dispute settlement. 
 23. LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 28495 (discussing evaluation of conflict man-
agement systems through case examples); Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neil B. McGillicuddy, 
Gary L. Welton & Lynn M. Castrianno, Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
313, 314 (1993). 
 24. See LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 186. 
 25. ADR Brief: ABA Meeting Examines Why Companies Dont Mediate at the EEOC, 22 ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 83, 86 (2004) [hereinafter ADR Brief]. 
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bating workplace tensions.26  Federal government officials involved in mediating 
disputes frequently equate settling a dispute with resolving conflict to the satisfac-
tion of the parties, representatives, and EEOC officials involved in the complaints.  
They believe that resolving individual cases adds up to solving systemic prob-
lems.27  If systems analysis does occur, it focuses on the performance of the con-
flict resolution system itselfits efficiency, level of party satisfaction, and cost.28  
This focus does not equip conflict resolvers to use knowledge gained from engag-
ing with recurring problems or institutional patterns.29  Mediations targeting col-
lective problems or group interests are often defined as such from the outset of the 
process, and explicitly avoid addressing individual issues.30 
Ombuds offices are a form of dispute resolution with responsibility for both 
individual and systemic issues.  They work for the resolution of particular issues, 
and where necessary, make recommendations for the improvement of the general 
administration of the entity.31  Ombuds offices have become common place in 
universities, corporations, and federal, state, and local government.32  Several 
ombuds organizations have emerged to provide information sharing and some 
measure of coordination among the various ombuds offices.33 
Ombuds offices typically combine individual conflict resolution with some 
responsibility for identifying complaint patterns and trends and providing upward 
feedback to the organizational leadership about systemic problems.34  Although 
___________________________  
 26. One study shows that 50% of companies avoid EEOC mediation because they believe it requires 
monetary compensation. Id. at 84. 
 27. Id. at 85.  
 28. See LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 26566.  For example, Bingham and Pitts 
have conducted an ongoing longitudinal evaluation of United States Postal Services REDRESS pro-
gram, the largest employment dispute resolution program. See Lisa B. Bingham & David W. Pitts, 
Highlights of Mediation at Work: Studies of the National REDRESS Evaluation Project, 18 NEGOT. J. 
135 (2002).  REDRESS provides facilitative mediation for equal opportunity disputes arising out of 
federal discrimination claims.  REDRESS is a case-by-case model that focuses on the individual.  
Although Indiana University has been evaluating the program since inception, the researchers data-
tracking focuses on individual concerns and perceptions, not necessarily systemic issues. Id. at 136. 
 29. See generally Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases is Too 
Little Too Late: An Organizational Conflict Management Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 
HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (arguing that current ADR approaches are ineffective and fail to address dis-
putes early enough, understand how conflicts arise, and explore a change in methods to deal with 
conflict). 
 30. See generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: 
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987). 
 31. ABA Standards, supra note 6, at 1. 
 32. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Ombudsman Offices in the Federal GovernmentAn Emerging Trend?, 
22 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS (1997), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/vol22no4/ombudsmn.html; D. Leah Meltzer, The Federal 
Workplace Ombuds, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 55253 (1998), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/fwtoc.html; Michael Mills, Municipal Government Om-
budsman (1994),  http://www.usombudsman.org/en/refer-
ences/more_references/municipal_government_ombudsman.cfm; Mary P. Rowe, The Corporate 
Ombudsman: An Overview and Analysis, 1 NEGOT. J. 127, 127 (1987) [hereinafter Rowe, Corporate 
Ombudsman]. 
 33. Lubbers, supra note 32; Gadlin, Whats in a Name?, supra note 2, at 41 (describing the creation 
of the Ombudsman Association, the United States Ombudsman Association, and University and 
College Ombudsman Association). 
 34. See Rowe, Corporate Ombudsman, supra note 32, at 131; see also Marsha Wagner, The Organ-
izational Ombudsman as Change Agent, 16 NEGOT. J. 99, 10708 (2000). 
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there are differences in type and philosophy,35 all ombudsmen give voice to 
people who might otherwise be disadvantaged in their dealings with the 
management and bureaucracy of the institution within which the ombuds-
man functions.36  Ombudsman Association surveys indicate that about a third 
of the working time of organizational ombudspeople is spent on systems change
that is working with line and staff managers to improve supervision, human ser-
vices and conflict management system of the organization.37 
Ombuds offices struggle with the question of how to integrate systemic inter-
vention into their regular practice.  Systems-level work consists primarily of peri-
odic reports to the public or to upper management based on an analysis of patterns 
from the aggregate data.38  Many offices are set up to separate individual from 
systemic work.39  Some offices do emphasize the ombuds ability to serve as an 
early warning systemto receive, perhaps analyze, then pass along information 
that will foster timely change in a company policy.40  This role is referred to as 
upward feedback.41  The ombuds offices thus function as information conduits 
to flag problems.  They do not routinely use systemic analysis as part of their in-
dividual casework, which is the primary focus of their practice.  Participation in 
organizational change initiatives is often described as a process entirely separate 
from case work, usually initiated by management in response to an identified 
problem or crisis.42 
On the surface, Integrated Conflict Management Systems (ICMS) look like 
programs designed to connect individual and systemic problem solving.  The goal 
of ICMS is to apply the techniques and sensibility of interest-based negotiation to 
the identification, prevention, management, and resolution of conflict within or-
ganizations.43  ICMS uses a coordinated set of easily accessible organizational 
mechanisms to identify conflict in its earliest stages, manage it carefully to pre-
vent escalation, and to resolve it efficiently in order to maintain positive work-
place relations.44 
Despite its emphasis on integration, the logic of ICMS in fact segregates the 
process of conflict resolution.  The system provides comprehensive services, but 
___________________________  
 35. Gadlin identifies two types of ombudsmen: classical and organizational, with variations in each 
category.  Classical ombudsmen emphasize statutory independence from governmental control, the 
power to investigate complaints, and the authority to publish findings and recommendations.  Organ-
izational ombudsmen generally approach issues within an organization beyond a right/wrong judg-
ment, but rather as an alternative to adjudicatory approaches. Gadlin, Whats in a Name?, supra note 2, 
at 38, 43. 
 36. Gadlin, Whats in a Name?, supra note 2, at 3748.  
 37. Mary P. Rowe & Dean M. Gottenhrer, Similarities and Differences Between Public and Private 
Sector Ombudsmen, (working paper prepared for the 1997 Spring Meeting of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Hotel Washington, Washington, D.C., 
Apr. 18, 1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/g&rsimilar.html. 
 38. Wagner, supra note 34; Rowe, Corporate Ombudsman, supra note 32, at 131-32. 
 39. Rowe, Corporate Ombudsman, supra note 32, at 132; ABA Standards, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
 40. Rowe, Corporate Ombudsman, supra note 32, at 131. 
 41. Id.; see also Meltzer, supra note 32, at IV.A.2. 
 42. See generally, e.g., Helen Hasenfeld, The Ombudsperson as a Change Agent (1995) (describing 
three examples of institutional change instigated by the ombudsperson at California Institute of Tech-
nology) (on file with author).  
 43. Howard Gadlin, Bargaining in the Shadow of Management: Integrated Conflict Management 
Systems 1 (Oct. 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 44. Id. 
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by different offices that are largely separate in their operation.  Individual con-
flicts could be resolved by a hotline, a mediation office, peer mediation, a griev-
ance procedure, or an ombudsman resolving individual conflicts.45  Systemic 
problems would be the responsibility of management.  Crucially, all of these sepa-
rate processes are then integrated into a unitary system overseen by management 
and committed to the goals of conflict prevention and improved productivity.46  
ICMS are often management driven, and precipitated by concerns about litigation 
reduction.47 
Like informal conflict resolution, adjudication also involves contexts with re-
peat players and recurring problems, especially when the adjudication is per-
formed by administrative agencies with responsibility for a particular domain.48  
Yet, administrative agencies also tend to separate their dispute resolution activities 
from their preventive and standard-setting work.49  They too proceed on the as-
sumption that cases are either private or public, individual or systemic, conflict 
resolving or norm generating.50  Administrative case processing tends to be sepa-
rated from problem identification and system reform.51  Federal agencies dispute 
resolution programs typically address disputes on an individual, case-by-case 
basis.52  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, for example, segre-
___________________________  
 45. See LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 168-82 (describing these organs as design 
features of an internal management systems). 
 46.  Mary Rowe, Dispute Resolution in the Nonunion Environment: An Evolution Toward Integrated 
Systems for Conflict Management, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 96-97 (Sandra Geason ed., 
1997) [hereinafter Rowe, Integrated Systems], available at 
http://web.mit.edu/ombud/publications/reso.pdf (describing a typical integrated conflict management 
system, which is administered by human resources and senior management). 
 47. See Jennifer F. Lynch, Beyond ADR: A Systems Approach to Conflict Management, Columns, 17 
NEGOT. J. 208, 212 (2001); Gadlin, supra note 43, at 8 (explaining that the conceptual framework of 
dispute systems design is formed almost exclusively around the concerns of managers: cutting costs, 
enhancing productivity, and containing conflict).  See also LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, 
at 6-8 (discussing corporate dissatisfaction with litigation as a form of dispute resolution, leading 
businesses to consider alternative procedures). 
 48. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, IMPOSING DUTIES: GOVERNMENTS CHANGING APPROACH TO 
COMPLIANCE 108-09 (1994). 
 49. Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases is Too Little Too Late: An 
Organizational Conflict Management Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 
264 (finding that ADR is typically used in tandem with traditional legal remedies. Mediation is 
largely being chosen after filing of EEOC complaints, after commencement of lawsuits, and as part of 
court-annexed ADR programs). 
 50. See Kenneth Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Ac-
countability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L. J. 377, 434 (2006); Lisa B. Bingham & Charles R. 
Wise, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990: How Do We Evaluate Its Success?, 6 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 383, 397 (1996), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/view/10531858/ap040023/04a00030/0 (evaluating the implementation of the Act 
in federal agency through empirical research and finding that ADR was used most in EEO disputes, 
personnel, and procurement, but did not extend broadly to the general public in regulatory and program 
matters).  See also generally Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and Advantages of 
Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPAs Project XL,  17 UCLA J. ENVTL L. & POLY 67 (1999) 
(describing the intellectual, legal and cultural obstacles that have impeded Environmental Protection 
Agency efforts to adopt a flexible approach to regulation). 
 51. Bill Simon made a similar observation about the separation of adjudication and administrative 
functions in the context of public assistance. See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class 
in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1246 (1983).    
 52. ADR Vision Roundtable: Challenges for the 21st Century, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Sept. 2001, at 
8, 16 (documenting this individual casework approach in federal agencies). 
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gates its case processing functions from its technical assistance, policy making, 
prevention, and training functions.  Internal Equal Employment Opportunity 
(EEO) offices that handle formal discrimination claims within bureaucracies are 
often set up much the same way: they process individual discrimination cases, but 
do not track patterns or reveal recurring patterns.53  Individual cases are analyzed 
only in terms of their impact on the formal parties.54 
Conflict resolution scholarship has to some degree reinforced this separation 
of individual and systemic intervention.  The classic articles celebrating the judi-
ciarys special role in elaborating public norms draw a stark line between private 
dispute resolution and public law.55  Typologies of conflict resolution typically 
place individual and systemic processes on different ends of a progression or on 
different levels of a dispute resolution pyramid.  Some analyses presume that sys-
temic issues should be reached only if individual dispute resolution fails.56  Others 
suggest that systemic problem solving will only work if individual conflict resolu-
tion takes a back seat.57  There has been relatively little work on the methodology 
of systemic conflict resolution, and even less on the relationship between individ-
ual and systemic interventions.  The field lacks research on how a practice struc-
tured around resolving cases can effectively integrate individual conflict resolu-
tion and systemic change without compromising the integrity of either.  Conflict 
resolution programs that try to connect these two levels often proceed intuitively, 
without adequate language or theories to guide their practice. 
C.  Rethinking the Conventional Wisdom 
This analysis suggests that the conventional separation of individual and sys-
temic problem solving should be rethought.  Well-structured linkage of individual 
conflict resolution and systemic change enhances the efficacy and legitimacy of 
both.  Indeed, in important respects, individual conflict resolution and systemic 
change are interdependent.  This section shows why linkage of individual and 
systemic conflict resolution is a good idea.  The next section illustrates these ar-
guments with examples from CCRs practice. 
One compelling reason to link individual and systemic conflict resolution is 
increased efficacy.  For individual cases, identification of underlying, systemic 
causes often de-personalizes a conflict and makes it possible to engage disputants 
___________________________  
 53. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Priority Charge Handling Task 
Force Litigation Task Force Report (1998), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task_reports/pchlit-1.html (reflecting the EEOCs segregation of 
individual from systemic work and of mediation from problem identification). 
 54. Some administrative agencies have adopted an approach that resembles CCRs in their effort to 
link individual case work and systemic redesign, particularly in the areas of criminal justice, health 
care and child welfare.  These programs are discussed infra in Sections III & IV. 
 55. Chayes, supra note 18, at 1284; Fiss, supra note 3, at 1085.  See Charles F. Sabel & William H. 
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1057 
(2004) (claiming that Chayess analysis ignores the systemic and self-consciously regulatory aspects 
of individual dispute resolution). 
 56. See, e.g., Lynch, supra, note 47, at 212 (describing systems designed so that conflict is resolved 
at the earliest time and the lowest level possible); Meltzer, supra note 32 at 572. 
 57. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rules Regimes, in LAW 
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 37, 53 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence]; SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 30, at 70-76. 
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in problem solving.  Moreover, conflict resolvers and disputants do not know at 
the outset of a conflict whether an issue is rooted in systemic problems, and 
whether those problems are amenable to a systemic intervention.  Many cases do 
not fall neatly into one or the other category.  As Carrie Menkel-Meadow com-
mented after mediating a series of auto accident cases: 
I am struck by the difficulty of characterizing disputes. On one hand, all 
of these cases were simple car accidents: factual disputes about small 
amounts of money, with issues ranging from full liability disputes to dis-
agreements about the value of medical expenses and property damage.  
. . . On the other hand, however, any single one of these cases could also 
be taken as representative of any number of very important public or de-
mocratic issues. Insurance companies were clamping down on alleged 
widespread fraud by plaintiffs, their doctors, and their lawyers in over-
claiming. Virtually all of these disputes involved the multicultural/racial 
issues that are sub rosa in increasingly diverse Los Angeles. Lawyers 
made arguments about how the racial composition of juries would affect 
the valuation of cases. And standards of human behavior and responsibil-
ity were constantly being negotiated in these sessions, both with refer-
ence to the law on the books and in reality.58 
Often, the capacity to understand and address cases effectively at the level of 
the individual requires a systemic understanding that develops from the opportu-
nity to step back and address problems outside the context of a particular conflict.  
Many individual problems cannot be remedied effectively without addressing 
their systemic underpinnings.  If individual problems are rooted in a system that 
remains unchanged, the problem is likely to resist remediation or to recur.  In any 
case, searching for systemic problems enhances legitimacy even when the search 
results in a determination that the system worked well, and that an individual in-
tervention was appropriate. 
Ongoing involvement with individual conflicts also enhances the capacity to 
address systemic issues, if the program is set up to link these two levels.  En-
gagement with cases over time equips conflict intermediaries to identify, under-
stand, and address systemic problems.  Case work enables problem identification 
to emerge out of ongoing pattern analysis, so that unrecognized problems can 
eventually be detected.  Many problems combine interpersonal aspects with struc-
tural aspects.  Both must be addressed for change to occur.  Ongoing casework 
may be necessary to create sufficient pressure or support for change, and to en-
gage stakeholders whose participation in the problem-solving process is required 
to develop workable and legitimate remedies.  The legitimacy of structural change 
often hinges upon also being able to remedy unfairness at the level of the individ-
ual.  Unresolved individual problems breed dissatisfaction with reform, and can 
foster resistance or backlash. 
Thus, individual casework provides situated knowledge, legitimacy, and par-
ticipation needed to sustain systemic change.  This analysis provides a counter-
argument to proposals for separating systemic change and individual conflict reso-
___________________________  
 58. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute?, supra note 2, at n.24 (internal citations omitted). 
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lution.  In Toyota Jurisprudence, for example, Bill Simon advocates bracketing 
and muting individual concerns, and focusing jurisprudence solely on systemic 
problem solving.  He expresses concern that attention to individual fairness con-
cerns necessarily disrupts a collective problem-solving process.  Simon draws on 
the example of Toyotas problem-solving system within its production process, in 
which every individual can pull an andon cord, which then stops production and 
forces everyone affected by or responsible for the breakdown to figure out how to 
prevent the problem from recurring.  Simon advocates applying this metaphor to 
the context of public problem solving.59  But his article does not address how to 
transfer this methodology from a business to a public arena.60  Systems change 
requires that information about systemic problems come from stakeholders operat-
ing at the points of breakdown, where changes in practice are most needed.  Reli-
ance on pre-constituted deliberative bodies or outside audits does not necessarily 
fulfill this function.  These methods tend to function outside the working unit; 
they do not necessarily involve those operating at crucial leverage points.  They 
also do not necessarily provide a mechanism to propel change.  Whats more, 
people may not recognize that the problems they experience have deeper roots, or 
that they can be remedied.  Many problems go undetected or remain unchanged 
because there is no impetus to address them.  Systems problems can be particu-
larly challenging to address in the context of crises, when relationships are highly 
charged and more adversarial. 
Conflict resolution can operate as this much-needed trigger for systemic 
analysis and change.  Conflicts are focused and discrete, and yet are connected to 
systems and underlying causes.  Issues raised through conflict resolution offer a 
mechanism prompting analysis and intervention, particularly when the costs of 
raising questions are low.  In many areas, the interactions around issues of indi-
vidual fairness are the equivalent of the andon cord on the Toyota shop floor.  
They are the trigger that brings recurring problems to the attention of the group.  
The linkage of individual and systemic problems allows breakdowns in practice to 
become part of the data contributing to the understanding of a systemic problem.  
They also allow a problem to be chunkedto be defined at the appropriate level 
of scope and depth so that it has the prospect of a successful intervention.61 
Although, conflict resolution practitioners have begun to recognize the impor-
tance of linking individual conflict resolutions with systemic change,62 they lack 
knowledge about how to connect these levels, both in their casework and in the 
design of the conflict resolution system.  Questions persist about how this integra-
___________________________  
 59. Simon, Toyota Jurispridence, supra note 57, at 45. 
 60. See JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT AND THE SOCIAL SECTORS 1 (2005) (rejecting the well-
intentioned, but dead wrong idea that social sectors can be strengthened by wholesale importation of 
common business practices). 
 61. Charles F. Sabel, A Real Time Revolution in Routines, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE 
COMMUNITY 106 (Charles Heckscher & Paul Adler eds., 2006). 
 62. See generally, e.g., John S. Barkat, Blueprint for Success: How to Effectively Design an Organ-
izational Ombuds Department (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/blue-3-
26-pm2.pdf (arguing that one of the three vital functions of an ombuds office is organizational critical 
self-analysis, using institutional knowledge gathered to improve organizational practices); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2004); Mary P. 
Rowe, The Ombudsmans Role in a Dispute Resolution System, 7 NEGOT. J. 353, 360 (1991) (arguing 
that ombuds practitioners can help to provide motivation, resources, and skills for continuous prob-
lem solving in times of change, within a dispute resolution system). 
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tion can be achieved without compromising basic principles such as confidential-
ity and commitment to participant agreement as the basis for intervention.  Ad-
dressing these how questions is a crucial step toward conducting conflict resolu-
tion so that it can generate public norms and achieve accountability.  The remain-
der of this article undertakes that important work. 
III.  ANALYZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SYSTEMIC 
WORK 
This section draws on CCRs practice to develop a framework for understand-
ing the dynamic relationship between individual and systemic work analysis and 
intervention.  It begins with a description of the office and its practice, and then 
fleshes out the meaning of systemic conflict by categorizing the kinds of systemic 
problems that may arise.  Finally, the analysis works through examples to illus-
trate the different ways in which individual and systemic work interrelate in prac-
tice. 
A.  An Overview of the Office of the Ombudsman/Center for Cooperative 
Resolution 
CCR is a comprehensive conflict resolution program offering assistance to 
employees in addressing conflicts and concerns involving scientific and work-
place issues at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). NIH is the federal focal 
point for medical research in the United States, and its mission is to uncover 
new knowledge about the prevention, detection, diagnosis and treatment of dis-
ease and disability.63  CCR was created in 1998, following a one-year pilot pro-
gram.  Its mission is to provide conflict prevention and intervention, conflict 
management including education, and case-specific follow up for NIH scientists 
and administrative employees.64  It operates as the hub of NIHs conflict process-
ing system by providing: (1) dispute resolution through neutral, confidential, and 
informal processes; (2) conflict management and prevention through training and 
education; and (3) dispute systems design to create or improve mechanisms to 
effectively handle disputes. 
CCR addresses every sort of issue that arises in the NIH environment: scien-
tific disputes, employer-supervisor conflicts, racial and ethnic tensions and diffi-
___________________________  
 63. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, FINAL FY2003 GPRA ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 
(2003), available at http://www1.od.nih.gov/gpra/fy2003final.pdf.  NIH is comprised of twenty-seven 
institutes and centers located on its Bethesda campus, plus relationships with universities, hospitals, 
research institutions, and pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that conduct research directed 
and/or funded by NIH.  About 10% of the NIHs budget supports projects conducted by nearly 6,000 
scientists in its own laboratories, most of which are on the NIH campus in Bethesda, Maryland.  NIH 
has an annual budget of approximately $28 billion. Id. 
 64. NIH OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE RESOLUTION, ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (1999), available at http://www4.od.nih.gov/ccr/ombudsman.pdf [hereinafter 1999 ANNUAL 
REPORT].  According to CCRs 2005 Business Plan, [c]ases increasingly involve scientific matters 
(collaboration issues, scientific vision, and authorship) or entire organizationa (lab units, branches, 
offices).  In 2003, 45% of the cases involved scientific matters and 50 of 518 cases  amost 10% -- 
were with groups of different sizes. Id.  In addition, CCR works closely with the EEO community, 
and this collaboration produced a 17 % increase in the resolution of precomplaints. Id. at 4-5. 
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culties between peers.65  CCR staff handles individual, interpersonal conflicts, 
multi-party, group, and organizational concerns.  They perform these functions 
through an array of techniques, including coaching, facilitation, consultation, shut-
tle diplomacy, peer panels, training, presentations, and systems design.  The office 
is specifically charged with responsibility for receiving and inquiring into work-
place disputes brought to the Ombudsman by any NIH staff member, initiating 
independent inquiries, identifying and analyzing systemic issues that foster work-
place disputes, and making recommendations to the appropriate responsible 
agency official(s) for changes in policies and procedures.66  The ombudsmen also 
participate ex officio on key committees addressing issues relevant to their work, 
such as the Ethics Committee and various policy committees.  They offer a range 
of services not limited to individual conflict resolution.  CCR is primed to think 
systematically about the relationship between individual and systemic issues and 
problems, and its role in mediating between the two levels. 
Although CCR is located administratively in the office of the Director, it op-
erates independently and is outside any of NIHs constituent institutes or centers.  
The Director is not authorized to dictate the methods, content, or focus of CCRs 
work.  CCR is not accountable to or integrated with management systems.  It is an 
independent office designed to help employees at all levels address conflicts and 
concerns about their work.67 
CCR is not the only conflict resolution program operating at NIH.  There is 
an Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity that processes discrimination com-
plaints,68 a human resources office that has established procedures accompanying 
adverse employment actions,69 a program to help handle situations in which there 
might be a threat of violence, and an employee assistance program providing 
counseling and referrals for personal, family, or job-related problems that could 
interfere with job performance or conduct.70 
A key feature of CCR is its deliberate design as an interdisciplinary collabo-
ration.71  The staff includes: (1) Howard Gadlin, the Ombudsman, a former ten-
ured professor of experimental psychology and university ombudsman;72 (2) The 
Deputy Ombudsman, who has a masters degree in public administration and a 
___________________________  
 65. NIH OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE RESOLUTION, FY 2005 
BUSINESS PLAN, 2 (2004). 
 66. NIH OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN/CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE RESOLUTION, FUNCTIONAL 
STATEMENT, http://www4.od.nih.gov/ccr/overview.html. 
 67. In this important respect, the logic behind CCR differs from Integrated Conflict Management 
Systems, which are designed to manage conflict to minimize costs and maximize productivity. See 
infra Sections III & IV. 
 68. An overview of the Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management is available at 
http://oeo.od.nih.gov/. 
 69. The NIH procedures for taking adverse action based on performance are set forth at 
http://hr.od.nih.gov/ER/Perfissues.htm. 
 70. An overview of employee relations at NIH is available at http://hr.od.nih.gov/ER/Default.htm. 
 71. Diversity of backgrounds was crucial to Howard in putting together the office.  He wanted to 
put together an ensemble of different people who could still work together. Interview with CCR 
Ombuds, Office of the Ombudsman/Center for Cooperative Resolution, National Institutes of Health, 
Department of Health and Human Services, in Bethesda, Md. (Feb. 28, 2002) (on file with authors). 
 72. Gadlin served as ombudsman while he was on the faculty at University of Massachusetts, Am-
hurst, and then worked as an ombudsman at UCLA before coming to NIH to create the Office of the 
Ombudsman. 
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certificate in organizational development;73 and (3) three associate ombudsmen, 
including an associate ombudsman with a counseling and psychology background 
and a Ph.D. in counseling psychology, another with a law degree and a Ph.D. in 
English literature and poetry, and a junior ombudsman with experience in a bio-
medical research laboratory and a recent law degree.  The office is also somewhat 
demographically diverse, by age, race, and gender. 
The office has made a commitment to reflect regularly about the systemic 
dimensions of its work.  This is in part built into its mission.  Like many ombuds 
offices, CCR is charged with helping the agency address systemic issues that arise 
in the context of their conflict resolution work.74  The office has undertaken to 
integrate systemic approaches into the fabric of its individual casework.  This 
commitment grew out of its ongoing reflective practice work.  The entire staff 
meets every Thursday to discuss their most interesting and challenging interven-
tions.  Case review is an ongoing form of critical evaluation, in an atmosphere 
where acknowledging uncertainty about ones actions is acceptable and identify-
ing mistakes is seen as a step toward improving effectiveness.75  CCR also has a 
staff huddle every Monday morning, so everyone will have an idea of what 
work is being done in the office.  They periodically write reports for the whole 
organization, which summarize their activities and focus attention on recurring 
problems and systemic issues.  They have worked intensively with a researcher 
using a reflective practice methodology inspired by Donald Schons work to in-
crease their understanding of conflict dynamics and effective interventions.76  This 
model enables them to talk easily about mistakes and successes in a safe way.77 
CCR employs a version of root cause analysis as its overarching methodol-
ogy.  The stance at the beginning of a case is one of inquiry: a careful, back-and-
forth process of identifying the source of the problem.  The ombuds officers have 
come to approach their cases through a process of discovery.  They attempt to 
identify the central issues in a conflict by asking why a certain problem exists, and 
why that state of affairs in fact constitutes a problem.  They then try to engage the 
appropriate actors in addressing the conflict or problem, either in the context of 
the particular dispute or at a more institutional level.  One of the strengths that 
Howard Gadlin brought to the office was the skill of reframing issues in new 
terms, which engages both interveners and parties in understanding the conflict on 
multiple levels.  Through critical reframing and root cause analysis, CCRs meth-
___________________________  
 73. Doris was hired because Howard was looking for someone who could perform multiple tasks, 
not only to intervene but to do training and program development.  Interview with CCR Ombuds, in 
Bethesda, Md. (Mar. 20, 2002) (on file with authors). 
 74. See Rowe, supra note 32, at 131; Meltzer, supra note 32, at 558; Wagner, supra note 34, at 107
08. 
 75. The process of critically evaluating cases that pose problems was inspired by the model of Mor-
bidity and Mortality rounds in medicine. Interview with Howard Gadlin, in Bethesda, Md. (Feb. 28, 
2002) (on file with authors).  See Atul Gawande, When Doctors Make Mistakes, THE NEW YORKER, 
Feb. 1, 1999, at 48. 
 76. See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN 
ACTION 61, 68-69 (1983) (describing the practice of reflection-in-action).  That collaboration led to 
another jointly authored article by Kenneth Kressel and Howard Gadlin, entitled Mediating Among 
Scientists: The Nature and Function of Implicit Mediator Schema. (unpublished manuscript on file 
with authors). 
 77. Id. at 2. 
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odology moves back and forth between the individual/personal and the sys-
temic/organizational.78 
The starting point for most CCR interventions is a consultation initiated by an 
NIH employee or group of employees.  Most people come to the CCR office be-
cause they question the fairness of an impending or actual decision or action.  
Typically, the ombudsman will review with the inquiring person the possible op-
tions for responding to the action as well as the possible consequences of pursuing 
those options.  In some instances people do not want direct intervention from the 
ombudsman.  They just seek some guidance on how to handle the situation in a 
less adversarial manner than they might use if left to their own devices.  In other 
instances they want the ombudsman to become directly involved. 
In every case, the ombudsmans first obligation is to understand the history 
and basic dynamics of the situation about which the person is consulting, the key 
issues for the person seeking the consultation, and that persons reasons and hopes 
for seeking help.  The ombudsman must craft interventions that are consonant 
with the needs and interests of the consulting party.  The ombudsman will explain 
the rationale for possible approaches to intervention, but will not proceed without 
the persons assent. 
If the person who first consulted the ombudsman gives permission, then the 
ombudsman may also discuss the matter with the person whose action or decision 
has triggered the inquirers concerns.  This is almost always the next step in situa-
tions where the person who made the initial contact asks the ombudsman to facili-
tate a discussion with the other party or even to conduct an actual mediation.  In 
those situations the ombudsman will first meet separately with the second party, in 
an attempt to understand the situation from that persons perspective and explain 
the ombudsmans obligations and commitment to fairness, impartiality, and neu-
trality. 
Over time CCR staff has learned that people often overestimate the signifi-
cance of individual factors and underestimate the importance of systemic factors 
as contributors to their problems, conflicts, and concerns.  Consequently, the types 
of questions the ombudsmen ask have evolved; they now ask questions designed 
to elicit information about the policies and practices, as well as the informal norms 
and values of the work group within which the problems have arisen, and how 
they might be contributing to those very problems. 
This attention to systemic factors puts the CCR ombuds in a different relation 
to disputants than mediators, the most common organizational conflict interven-
ers.  While ombuds share with mediators a commitment to helping the disputants 
pursue their interests, CCR ombuds recognize that achieving those interests al-
most always requires changes in several areas: the working relationship between 
the disputing parties, each partys understanding of the situation, and some aspects 
of the policies or practices that guide everyday interactions within the organiza-
tion or one of its subunits. 
___________________________  
 78. Interview with CCR Ombuds, in Bethesda, Md. (Feb. 6,  2002) (on file with authors).  Root 
cause analysis is discussed at greater length infra in Section IIIB. 
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B.  A Taxonomy of Systemic Problems 
Through the process of analysis, it became clear that each ombudsman was 
using the term systemic or structural to mean different things, and that in fact 
a problem could be systemic in different ways. 79  The authors also found them-
selves using the terms systemic and structural interchangeably, with subtle 
differences in emphasis.  Structural was used to refer to patterns that were built 
into organizational routines, policies, or roles.  Systemic was used more broadly 
to refer to any problem that was embedded in a set of ongoing relationships or 
interactions.  Here, the authors have opted for the language of systemic prob-
lems, to maintain the analytic tension between problem identification and the level 
of intervention. 
Before analyzing the relationship between individual conflict resolution and 
systemic change, it will be helpful to survey the indicators suggesting to the prac-
titioner that a problem has a systemic source. 
1.  Analysis of Patterns: Recurring Problems, Parties, and Sites 
The most straightforward clue to the systemic nature of a problem is that it 
recurs.  Analysis of cases over time reveals patterns in the types or locations of 
problems, the identity of the parties, or the dynamics producing the case.  CCR 
does an aggregate analysis somewhat systematically, by compiling data about the 
types of problems and their location.80  They also identify patterns through their 
weekly reflective practice work, discussing cases or problems that pose particular 
challenges to the ombuds or might be of particular interest to the office as a 
whole.  Examples of recurring problems that have been identified in this manner 
include: recurring disputes about scientific collaboration, problems stemming 
from personal relationships among partners or spouses in labs, and problems 
stemming from failure to provide feedback or supervision. 
Some institutes or work units are the site of a disproportionate number of con-
flicts or problems.  Occasionally the problems involve the same individuals or 
managers within the site.  Sometimes the problematic patterns are replicated 
among different players within a work site.  A site with a high rate of conflict that 
cannot be constructively addressed can trigger an inquiry about the underlying 
causes of these problems. 
2.  Policy Problems, Ambiguities, or Gaps 
A second type of structural issue involves gaps or problems with formal pol-
icy.  Sometimes problems occur because a rule or practice was developed without 
anticipating a particular type of consequence or situation.  A dispute may arise 
___________________________  
 79. See generally GHARAJADEGHI, supra note 17;  Jones, supra note 17.  
 80. See Case Report Form, October 7, 2004 (on file with author).  A Government Accounting Office 
report to Congress on ombuds organizations in Federal agencies noted that NIH was unique in keeping 
case statistics. NIH OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE RESOLUTION, FY 
2005 BUSINESS PLAN, 4 (2004) (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: The Role of 
Ombudsmen in Dispute Resolution (2001) (GAO-01-466), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01466.pdf). 
File: 462DEC6C-3A12-28F60E.doc Created on:  4/23/2007 7:11 PM Last Printed: 4/24/2007 4:05 AM 
20 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2007 
 
that falls in the gray area of the policy and thus prompts confusion or arbitrariness.  
In many ways these are the easiest kind of structural case to address.  Disputes or 
conflicts are traced to an ambiguity or gap in policy, which can be cured both for 
the individual and the organization through policy change.  Gaps in policy may 
also produce recurring conflicts, such as around issues of family leave, for exam-
ple.  These policy gaps may also signal disagreements about organizational priori-
ties or the inability of lower status employees to mobilize sufficient attention to 
the issues affecting them. 
3.  Problems or Inequities Recurring within Identifiable Groups 
Issues involving race, gender, disability, age, and national origin also emerge 
as systemic issues.  They recur, in part, because these groups experience a com-
mon set of dynamics and problems.  For example, women scientists who are per-
ceived as tokens within a predominantly male work group, in disciplines that are 
also predominantly male, face common experiences that are replicated across the 
agency.  At times spousal relationships within labs surface as a source of recurring 
problems.  In addition, there are large scale status differences within NIH that 
correlate with race.  Labs are sometimes heavily identified with scientists from a 
particular countrythe home country of the leader of the work group.  This can 
create difficulties for lab workers from other nationalities or ethnic groups.  Other 
non-demographic groups can also be identified as experiencing systemic prob-
lems.  Contract employees, part-time employees, and post-doctoral fellows are 
among those for whom recurring problems signal issues in the underlying system. 
Race and gender conflicts also recur because these are the categories of 
analysis that have legal protection and for which one can bring a complaint.  To 
the extent that there is a mismatch between the way a problem is framed and how 
it is experienced, that mismatch is itself a systemic problem. 
4.  Dysfunctional Management or Organizational Structures 
Some problems are rooted in the way the organization has structured the work 
itself.  There may be insufficient accountability for decisions by those in positions 
of power.  There may be a mismatch between organizational responsibilities (such 
as managing a work team) and professional incentives (such as pursuing funds and 
publishing articles).  These work arrangements may heighten tensions between 
workers of different status without providing mechanisms for participation or for 
addressing the resulting problems.  The work unit may also systematically fail to 
promote information flow and collaboration, both of which are crucial to accom-
plishing the work. 
5.  Major Organization-Wide Initiatives, Crises, or Disruptions 
Major events or crises can create systemic issues or problems.  As an agency 
of the federal government, NIH is subject to system-wide developments that can 
have major repercussions across the entire organization.  One such development 
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involves Executive Order A-76.81  This order implements the current policy of the 
executive branch to privatize where possible by requiring all government services, 
other than those designated as inherently governmental, to demonstrate that their 
team is the most efficient organization (MEO) for each activity.  A-76 essentially 
requires every branch of the agency not designated as inherently governmental to 
demonstrate that it is more efficient to provide the service through government 
actors than to contract out to the private sector.  A-76 has required an extensive 
review process, accompanied by considerable uncertainty and risk for those em-
ployees potentially affected.  This process has led to reorganizations, downsizing 
of departments, and high turnover rates.  It has had a major impact on the morale 
and staff composition of NIH, particular among the technical and service employ-
ees.  As such, it has introduced system-wide issues, some of which lie beyond the 
control of NIH.  In fact, any kind of high-level administrative change in leadership 
or general administration of the federal government produces yet more changes 
that ripple throughout the organization. 
6.  Problems Rooted in the Surrounding Culture 
Systemic problems may also be rooted in cultural norms and practices of the 
surrounding environment.  For example, some of the challenges facing NIH stem 
from the structure and culture of science, which is located in a broader institu-
tional and professional environment, which in turn shapes relationships and con-
flicts among scientists.  Some of the hierarchies that create conflicts and problems 
stem from relationships that are structured by the larger discipline or profession.  
The fact that science and technology are constantly changing, and that new scien-
tists do a substantial portion of the hands-on work in the lab, creates structural 
problems for veteran scientists, who are always at risk of being bypassed by new 
techniques, findings, and discoveries.  Collaborators have to contend with the fact 
that most people have been educated and continue to operate within a particular 
discipline, while contemporary biomedical research is increasingly inter-
disciplinary.  The financial and reputational reward structures for scientists may 
encourage behavior that is inconsistent with professional, ethical, or legal norms.  
Bureaucratic processes frequently clash with those used to conduct scientific re-
search.  A bureaucracy is rule-bound, emphasizing standardization and routiniza-
tion.  This bureaucratic sensibility is very different than the scientific sensibility, 
which does not necessarily follow a chain of command, emphasizes creativity, 
resists being told what to do, and features independent thinkers who are accus-
tomed to a lot of control over their work and work conditions, and who thus may 
without malice aforethought break the rules. 
 
Our discussions also revealed a repertoire of responses to problems imposed 
by structural features of the bureaucracy; these responses include frustration and 
avoidance, acknowledgement, referral, reframing the understanding of the pro-
tagonists, reframing the contours of the problem solving process, creating occa-
___________________________  
 81. Executive Office of the President, OMB, (May 29, 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_rev2003.pdf; National Institutes of Health, Office 
of Management Assessment, A-76 and Fair Act, http://a-76.nih.gov/. 
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sions for addressing structural problems at different levels of the institution, facili-
tating interactions, training and capacity building, developing tools for internal 
and external use in ongoing problem solving, forming new partnerships or institu-
tional relationships, and facilitating institutional creation or redesign. 
C.  Developing a Conflict Resolution Matrix 
CCRs methodology places conflict resolution in the context of a problem-
solving process.  The conflict resolution/problem-solving process can be under-
stood to involve two distinct but deeply intertwined components: analysis and 
intervention.  Analysis includes defining, framing and diagnosing the problem.  
Intervention includes generating solutions, selecting a course of action, and im-
plementing those decisions.82  These components of the work do not necessarily 
operate in stages.  In fact, both in any discrete case and over time, conflict resolu-
tion moves back and forth from diagnosis to intervention to re-analysis of the 
problem and redefinition of the possible interventions.  Conflict resolution as it is 
practiced by CCR involves a dynamic relationship between inquiry and interven-
tion. 
A matrix usefully organizes inquiry about the relationship between individual 
and systemic problems within the different components of conflict resolution. As 
the researchers examined how systemic issues arose in a series of cases, they 
found it necessary to assess the individual or systemic character of their decision 
making for each component of the conflict resolution process.  The problem 
analysis could be individual or systemic, and the intervention performed could 
also be individual or systemic.  This realization initially led to the placement of 
analysis in the context of a two-by-two matrix, with the component of the conflict 
resolution process on one axis and the quality of the conflict as individual or sys-
temic on the other, as depicted below. 
Analysis and Intervention Matrix 
 Individual Systemic 
Analysis   
Intervention   
Figure 1 
 
Examination of a series of cases revealed that the level of analysis (individual 
or systemic) frequently differs from the level of intervention.  The analysis could 
be systemic and the intervention could nonetheless be individual, and vice versa.  
Also, the understanding of a problem as individual or systemicand the capacity 
to intervene systemicallychanges over time.  This realization led to the devel-
opment of a matrix charting the relationship between the level of analysis and the 
level of intervention.  This conflict resolution matrix structures inquiry to reveal 
___________________________  
 82. See MacDuffie, supra note 17, at 481.   
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which combination of analysis and intervention is operating at different points of 
the process: 
Conflict Resolution Matrix 
Quadrant I 
Individual Analysis/ 
Individual Intervention 
Quadrant III 
Systemic Analysis/ 
Individual Intervention 
Quadrant II 
Individual Analysis/ 
Systemic Intervention 
Quadrant IV 
Systemic Analysis/ 
Systemic Intervention 
Figure 2 
 
Analyzing a series of problems through the lens of this matrix exposes the 
types of problems that are more or less amenable to systemic intervention through 
conflict resolution.  It highlights the implications of using a systemic frame to 
analyze problems that are not amenable to systemic intervention.  This framework 
also provides a schematic to track the movement of cases over time from one cell 
of the matrix to another.  The matrix is not intended to suggest that cases can be 
compartmentalized as individual or systemic, but rather to facilitate understanding 
of how the work moves back and forth from one combination of analysis and in-
tervention to another.  This framework also focuses attention on the processes that 
build capacity to address problems at a systemic or structural level. 
What follows is an application of this framework to particular problems that 
were handled by CCR.  This analysis provides examples showing the linkage of 
individual and systemic work.  These examples will be used in subsequent sec-
tions as a springboard for reconsidering the prevailing assumptions about conflict 
resolutions efficacy and legitimacy.83  Discussion of each quadrant of the matrix 
will begin with an individual case, mirroring the typical manner in which issues 
come to the attention of the office.84  People who come to the office are looking 
for assistance in addressing a specific situation affecting their work.  In each cell 
we then illustrate how CCR moves from analyzing individual case dynamics to a 
broader systemic analysis. 
1.  Individual Analysis, Individual Intervention 
The spurned scientist.  Consider the following example from a case review 
meeting:  John, an established and well-known staff scientist with an international 
reputation, came to CCR complaining that he was treated unfairly by a search 
committee.  He had applied for a position as a scientist at another NIH institute 
and was not selected.  He gave a seminar, and then was not asked to interview for 
___________________________  
 83. See infra Sections III-IV. 
 84. These case studies are drawn from multiple CCR case review meetings that were observed by 
the authors or their researchers. Some details have been withheld to preserve confidentiality.  Case 
reviews and interviews, Office of the Ombudsman/Center for Cooperative Resolution, National Insti-
tutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services, in Bethesda, Md. (Feb. 2001Jun. 2005) 
(on file with authors). 
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the position.  He claimed that the search process was unfair, and that the search 
committee was biased in favor of an internal candidate.  John based his conclusion 
on the fact that he has a higher profile and more publications in the relevant field 
than the candidate selected for the position.  Although he was not a native-born 
American and spoke with an accent, he did not suggest that national origin had 
played a role in the decision-making process. 
With Johns permission, the ombudsman spoke with Tom, the individual to 
whom the search committee made its recommendation and who made the job 
offer.  Tom had met with John about why he was not selected, and had taken seri-
ously Johns concern that the search process might not have been fair.  Tom had 
undertaken an extensive investigation of the decision-making process.  He inter-
viewed everyone on the search committee as well as the people who had attended 
the presentation.  He determined that the decision not to interview John was based 
on an assessment of the quality of the seminar and the candidates reference let-
ters.  The consensus among everyone interviewed, confirmed by a review of the 
presentation, was that John was not a creative scientist, and that creativity was a 
key criterion for the new position.  This kind of creativity was not a significant 
component of Johns current position, but would be crucial for success in the new 
one.  The scientist selected was known for his creativity, even though he did not 
have as many publications in the field as John.  Tom also learned that John got 
along with his lab chief, and was secure in his current position.  Based on this 
review, Tom concluded that the process was thorough, fair, and justified.  He 
communicated this to John. 
The ombudsman assigned to the case reviewed the record and spoke with 
John and Tom, as well as other decision makers involved with the case.  The om-
budsman agreed with Toms general assessment of the selection process and also 
noted that the criteria used to reach the decision were well-specified and fairly 
applied.  The problem was traced not to issues with the adequacy of the process 
(which was well-executed) or with bias having to do with national origin (which 
was never mentioned by the complainant and did not correspond to any pattern of 
decision making within the office).  Nor did the inquiry reveal any issues with the 
quality of feedback or supervision within Johns work-group.  He had received 
considerable mentoring, coaching, feedback, and support.  The ongoing conflict 
was traced to Johns personal characteristics that made it difficult for him to ac-
cept the decision.  He assumed that because he was a well-known and established 
scientist, he was the best qualified for the job.  He was having a hard time coming 
to grips with his own qualifications.  He was considering a more formal com-
plaint, which he could assert both by raising the issue with the top level adminis-
trators at NIH and by filing an EEO complaint.  In the early stages of the process, 
the ombuds officer tried coaching, to communicate to John that there might be 
unrecognized aspects of his style and actions that were working against him.  John 
was not able or willing to engage in self-reflection as part of this process, and the 
ombudsmans goal became to direct John toward a formal process that could pro-
duce a fair and definitive resolution of his challenge to the search process. 
This case illustrates the first cell of the matrix: an individual diagnosis, 
prompting an individual intervention.  Although the type of decision at issue is a 
recurring one, inquiry revealed no apparent problems with the process used to 
reach the decision or the criteria that were applied.  Nor was Johns lack of suc-
cess in this process indicative of more general patterns of non-performance or 
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non-supervision.  Resolution of this problem would occur through activities di-
rected at resolving the individual conflict, whether by informal coaching by CCR, 
or by formal decision by the EEO.  Although case review raised questions about 
the appropriate role and responsibility of CCR in working with people who lacked 
the capacity to reflect about their own behavior, it did not produce any systemic 
insights or interventions. 
2.  Individual Conflict, Systemic Intervention 
The troubled employee.  Consider a second type of problem that came up nu-
merous times during case review: employees with serious psychological or health 
conditions that give rise to performance or disciplinary issues.  An employee came 
to CCR to challenge a letter of reprimand issued because of bizarre and disturbing 
behavior attributed to him at the worksite.  The behavior was of a kind that 
strongly suggested the employee had mental health problems.  The employee 
wanted the letter of reprimand removed from his file.  There was no dispute that 
the behavior was serious and offensive enough to warrant disciplinary action, but 
the employee had initially denied taking the action.  At the time, the employee 
was receiving counseling from the Employee Assistance Program (EAP).  Interac-
tions with the employee, along with discussions with his co-workers and supervi-
sors, indicated that the employee had serious psychological issues that were creat-
ing disruptions within his work group, but that he was otherwise competent at his 
job.  At first glance, these problems look like quintessential individual conflicts, 
or at least situations involving systems that are beyond the scope of organizational 
intervention.  CCRs work showed, however, that systemic interventions could be 
developed to improve the organizations capacity to address individual cases. 
The work began with an inquiry to verify that the process used to determine 
the employees involvement was thorough and fair, and that the problems most 
likely stemmed from the employees psychological issues.  This inquiry raised 
issues about how the organization handled problems of this character.  It revealed 
an ongoing relationship with the EAP counselor, to whom the ombudsman regu-
larly refers cases involving very pathological employees who are willing to seek 
counseling.  Experience showed that this particular counselor had been extremely 
effective in providing counseling services in such cases.  The ombudsman also 
explored how best to utilize the different counselors within the NIH system.  This 
process enabled the ombudsman to figure out a way to connect the letter of repri-
mand to a process for getting the employee psychological help in managing his 
behavior in the workplace, without breaching confidentiality.  The client agreed 
that it made sense for the ombudsman to follow up with the EAP counselor, with 
whom the office worked regularly. 
This inquiry led to a CCR discussion of the parallels between this case and 
cases involving violence at work, and particularly the importance of a recovery 
period for employees in the affected work unit after such incidents.  The ombuds-
men shared and compared experiences involving several different cases and indi-
cated the importance of addressing this issue more systemically.  Two staff mem-
bers suggested studies of reactions to violence at work, to be discussed at their 
journal club meeting.  Another ombuds officer was asked to gather resources and 
information about the protocol for managing the aftermath.  They then discussed 
how to look at the problem from their different disciplinary backgrounds (legal, 
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organizational, psychological) and how that inquiry could help them in designing 
more effective organizational responses.  They decided to invite the EAP counsel-
ors, including one who did her Ph.D. dissertation about the aftermath of traumatic 
events, to a discussion comparing this case with two other cases involving recov-
ery in the workplace after trauma or extreme psychological problems. 
Five months later, at case review, there was additional follow up.  One om-
budsman described an ongoing project with the same EAP counselor to develop 
role plays for helping people who do not want to or cannot help themselves.  The 
group decided to bring in a psychiatrist who could evaluate several situations with 
a psychiatric element, and then help translate these evaluations into organizational 
interventions that were effective in addressing similar cases.  They discussed the 
limitations of integrating this work into the handling of a specific ongoing case, 
because of the compelling nature of the immediate issues and the personalities 
involved.  They were searching for and identifying systemic ways to equip groups 
to deal with people with mental health problems. 
These discussions also prompted the questioning of prevailing norms at NIH.  
Sometimes, co-workers or supervisors want to discipline, transfer, or fire employ-
ees because they do not conform to perceived civility norms.  CCR raised the 
question of how and the extent to which a bureaucracy could tolerate eccentric 
behavior, and whether there was a double standard for the range of acceptability 
depending on ones status in the organization.  The analysis also revealed the cul-
tural roots of certain norms, such as whether one is loud or quiet in ones interac-
tions at work. It showed ways to create contexts where work groups could actively 
negotiate about the prevailing norms.  These issues were raised not only with par-
ticipants in particular disputes, but also with those in a position to set relevant 
policy, such as human resources officials. 
Cases like the one above exemplify individual conflicts involving repeated 
problems rooted in psychological or family systems located outside work, but that 
present recurring challenges to the organization.  The systemic intervention con-
sists of building the organizations capacity to work with and accommodate prob-
lems that are rooted in individual dysfunctions that are not uncommon among a 
large group of workers.  These systemic interventions can produce new norms and 
processes for responding to problems existing independent of the workplace that 
affect employees ability to perform.  These norms and processes build organiza-
tional capacity to handle conflict constructively, to structure work effectively, and 
to provide support both to the individual and to his or her co-workers. 
Also, once these individual issues are placed in a systemic frame, they can re-
veal and make accessible recurring problems affecting many employees.  For 
example, carpal tunnel cases often reveal potential problems with how work is 
being performed or how offices are set up.  Although the problems are experi-
enced most intensively by those with carpal tunnel syndrome, they can compro-
mise the health and productivity of a larger group of employees.  The solution to 
the individual problem may require or prompt redesign of office equipment or 
reallocation of work responsibilities, which will address the individual problem 
and potentially generate improvements in more general office practices. 
Sometimes dysfunctions in the organization that affect everyone are only 
raised by those with heightened sensitivity to unfair or arbitrary treatment.  Par-
ticularly when that treatment involves offices operating within separate units of 
the organization with little cross-institutional interaction at a policy level, these 
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problems can be difficult to identify and address.  For example, CCR has had 
cases that raised problems about the relationship between the police on the NIH 
campus and the professional staff. 
If those systemic issues are ones that cannot be addressed, either in the con-
text of the particular dispute or at their root, then the problem gets resolved at the 
individual level, either by equipping the difficult individuals with the tools to 
cope with an organizational problem or by removing the difficult individual if that 
persons behavior violates important work norms and resists behavioral change.  
Prompted by recurring cases of the kind exemplified in this case study, CCR is 
now working with managers to identify triggers that bring out this behavior and 
steps that could be taken to reduce paranoia or other expressions of mental illness.  
One ombudsman is putting together a list of nearby psychiatrists with particular 
specialties.  CCR has facilitated discussions about how to improve the process of 
referral to outside counseling, the relationship between psychological evaluation 
for disciplinary purposes and psychological referrals for therapeutic purposes, as 
well as how best to structure the ongoing relationship with the EAP counselor 
within the constraints of confidentiality and roles. 
An organizational response emerged from CCRs exposure, through case 
analysis, to the communication and coordination gap among the various offices 
that might be involved in addressing the behavior of violent or unstable employ-
ees.  CCR urged the formation of an informal group of people, involving represen-
tatives from the full range of offices that might have some role to play.  The group 
formed and began to meet on a regular basis, with the idea of conducting follow-
up in particular instances and brainstorming about an effective coordinated re-
sponse.  This process led to two systemic changes: (1) a clearly formulated and 
widely distributed policy about violence; and (2) the establishment of a special-
ized office to handle these kinds of problems.  This office became the central con-
tact point for people who had any concern about violence or potential for violence 
in the workplace.  It now has the responsibility and the expertise to convene the 
appropriate actors to discuss individual situations and develop an intervention 
plan.  Managers and employees alike can appear before this group asking for 
guidance and assistance.  By comparison to the chaos that existed beforehand, this 
program is quite an improvement. 
3.  Structural Problem, Individual Intervention 
The under-appreciated, black employee.  A black male employee working in 
a technical position came to CCR with a concern that he was being treated un-
fairly.  Although he had always received a satisfactory job rating, he was not re-
ceiving promotions at the same rate as comparable employees. He was rarely 
praised for his performance and was denied tuition reimbursement for work-
related courses he was taking on his own time while working toward a college 
degree.  He came to CCR after being written up for losing his temper during an 
interaction with another employee who had asked for his help on a technical mat-
ter that was a part of his job responsibility.  Although he believed that race was 
the primary reason for his past unfair treatment, he did not want to pursue an EEO 
complaint about the disciplinary action because he did not believe that his race 
was a factor in his current supervisors decision making.  The manager who had 
written him up was a relatively new supervisor in his work unit, and the employee 
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believed they had a good working relationship that might be damaged if he filed a 
formal complaint.  Ironically, the write-up for the incident was one of the rare 
occasions when he had received direct feedback.  In this case, the employee be-
lieved that his new supervisor was one of the few people who might understand 
why he felt that his previous supervisors had been unfair to him because of race.  
He asked CCR to facilitate a discussion with this supervisor, the very person who 
had written him up for the incident.  Although he wanted to discuss the discipli-
nary action, he was more concerned about discussing the history of past injustices 
with his supervisor. 
This case illustrates the third quadrant of the matrix, which involves problems 
that have been identified as systemic, but which are nonetheless addressed through 
an intervention focused on the individual issues or parties to the presenting con-
flict.  These are situations in which CCR determines that the problem, although 
systemic in character, cannot or should not currently be addressed at its root 
cause.  This occurs where CCR has unsuccessfully attempted a systemic interven-
tion as well as in situations where the person whose complaint brought the prob-
lem to CCRs attention was unwilling to have the specific details of their case 
used as a link to the systemic issues. 
This case illustrates a variety of interrelated systemic issues.  Many of the 
cases handled by CCR can be traced back to an organizational culture in which 
issues, tensions, conflicts, and performance problems are overlooked until they 
blow up into crises.  One important contributor to this structural problem derives 
from managers and supervisors who fail to provide ongoing feedback and criti-
cism to employees about their work.  The performance evaluation system in place 
at that time discouraged managers from providing such feedback to those whose 
work needed improvement, because it was a pass-fail system that did not require 
managers to differentiate among levels of acceptable performance.85  At first, 
CCR believed that it was the pass-fail system itself that was responsible for the 
difficulties.  Without regular opportunities for managers to provide critical feed-
back to employees, CCR found that employees interpreted such feedback in per-
sonal terms on those occasions when it was offered.  In case analysis, the om-
budsmen commented that many managers were reluctant to provide ongoing criti-
cal feedbackbecause they prefer to avoid conflict, or they do not invest ade-
quate time in evaluating work, or they are worried that critical performance 
evaluations will prompt grievances.  As a result, correctable problems persisted, 
and when the problems reached a more serious level, employees experienced the 
feedback as arbitrary and unfair.86  However, as NIH moves to a four-point 
evaluation system, there are early signs that the pass-fail system was merely an 
indicator, not a root cause, of the culture of managerial avoidance. 
Racial dynamics interact in significant ways with this more general failure to 
provide ongoing feedback; often managerial avoidance is most extreme when 
managers and employees have different racial or ethnic identities.87  CCR saw 
___________________________  
 85. NIH OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, CENTER FOR COOPERATIVE RESOLUTION, ANNUAL REPORT 
2000 18 (2000), available at http://www4.od.nih.gov/ccr/fy00annualrpt.pdf [hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL 
REPORT]. 
 86. 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 10, 15. 
 87. See Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution, Cultural Differences, and the Culture of Racism, 10 
NEGOT. J. 33, 42 (1994). 
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examples of managers who were particularly reluctant to give critical feedback to 
staff of color.  In some instances, this was because managers seemed uncomfort-
able communicating about problems and did not have close enough working rela-
tionships to overcome this discomfort.  Adding to their discomfort was the fear 
that if they did give critical feedback, they might be regarded as racist.  On the 
other side of this dynamic are employees who are not receiving the sort of critical 
guidance they need to improve their performance.  In addition to not having the 
same opportunity to address shortcomings as their colleagues do, these employees 
often feel undervalued, leading to demoralization and withdrawal, which in turn 
makes the process of constructive criticism even less likely.88  Then, when they 
are not given promotions, or when performance problems accumulate and become 
serious issues, they are ill-equipped to understand the criticisms. 
The existing conflict resolution systems complicate efforts to address racial 
dynamics as a systemic problem.  Overshadowing all employee-manager issues in 
the federal workplace is the EEO system.  The federal governments EEO process, 
intended as a means of addressing discrimination in the workplace, has generated 
distrust and criticism from employees and managers alike.89  Because employees 
perceive the EEO process as the only way to get managements attention, they 
may file discrimination claims to address problems that they may not see as pri-
marily about discrimination.90  Neither agencies nor managers want to be known 
as having a large number of EEO complaints.  Many managers acknowledge that 
they avoid confronting workplace problems because they do not want to endure 
the various stresses and accusations associated with the EEO complaint process.91  
The discrimination frame also affects whether racial dynamics operating in a par-
ticular dispute will be identified and addressed.  When problems are framed in 
terms of race, the issue becomes whether someone is a racist, and thus blamewor-
thy.  The anti-discrimination framework leads participants to ask the question: was 
race the determinative cause of this decision?  If the answer is no, then race drops 
out of the analysis, even if racial dynamics are an important but not determinative 
element of the problem.  The dynamics of cognitive bias and cultural exclusion 
may not be visible at the level of the individual case, and many people do not 
understand race in these terms.92  Consequently, they lack the frameworks and 
language to deal with race as part of the larger issue. 
These micro-dynamics are reinforced by larger cultural and organizational 
patterns.93  Black and Latino employees make up a small proportion of the scien-
tists and scientific managementthat is, the high status employeesand  a much 
larger proportion of the technicians and service employees, who are the lower 
___________________________  
 88. See id. at 43. 
 89. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 85, at 18; see also Gourlay & Soderquist, supra note 29, 
at 262-63 (discussing delays in the federal EEO process affecting management and employees alike). 
 90. See Meltzer, supra note 32, for a description of a similar dynamic in other federal agencies.  
 91. See ADR brief, supra note 25, at 84; Gadlin, supra note 87, at 42-43.  
 92. See Linda Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimina-
tion and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-88 (1995), Barbara Reskin, 
The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 326-27 (2000). 
 93. See Kenneth Avruch, Integrating Ideas of Culture, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism into Conflict 
Resolution and ADR Practice (Aug. 6, 2002) (unpublished manuscript discussing the process and 
problems of identifying when culture is involved in a conflict) (on file with authors). 
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status employees.94  This structural power difference produces racially-inflected 
tensions and dissatisfaction that would not meet the EEO definition of discrimina-
tion.95  CCR has identified the need to diagnose and address racial issues outside 
the context of discrimination claims and with substantial support from high levels 
within the organization.  Ironically, while NIH has many programs to recruit, 
retain, and promote minority scientists, these programs have limited success be-
cause they do not effectively address the structural barriers to diversifying the 
pool.96 
CCR documented these concerns about racial dynamics in its annual report to 
the organization in 2000.  The organization has proposed several initiatives to 
create a context in which NIH can address management issues at a more systemic 
level and undertake a process of institutional engagement around issues of race.  
Some of these efforts have been undertaken as part of resolving a particular case; 
others have been undertaken by CCR in its reporting or facilitating roles.  How-
ever, many of the problems stemming from the culture of management and race 
within the organization have proven difficult to address at a systemic level.  The 
same dynamics that produce the problem seem to short-circuit efforts to reconfig-
ure roles and systems needed for integrated problem solving to occur.  Discrete 
systems that now operate separately would need to operate interdependently.  
Workplace management would need to be seen and understood as an integral part 
of doing good science, and race and gender would have to be connected to the 
core work of the organization.97 
Analysis of the casework and the systems intervention work shows that many 
of these systemic interventions have not been sustainable, or have not generated 
an adequate level of organizational engagement.  Conflicts stemming from these 
deeply embedded organizational patterns are more likely to be resolved at the 
individual level.  Sometimes the structural analysis is helpful in enabling indi-
viduals to de-personalize their problems and to find ways to work around the dy-
namics of management and race in their particular context.  Sometimes identifying 
the structural problems only deepens the sense of frustration about the inability to 
respond.  The case of the under-appreciated minority employee illustrates this 
point.  His personal work history may or may not be an example of racial dis-
crimination, but his awareness of the broader institutional problems around race 
served to reinforce his own conviction that he, too, was being treated unfairly on 
the basis of race.  Although he was certainly concerned about the systemic issues, 
his immediate interest was to address and improve his particular situation; that 
individual situation necessarily became the focus of the ombudsmens work with 
the employee. 
Cases also arise where the problem presents as an issue about the fairness of a 
particular decision or a conflict between two employees, but the discussion reveals 
___________________________  
 94. See OFFICE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT, QUARTERLY REPORT, 
THIRD QUARTER FY 2006 482-94 (2006), available at 
http://oeo.od.nih.gov/policiesresources/sitesresources/QtrlyRpt3rdQtr06.pdf. 
 95. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 85, at 20. 
 96. See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equality in Higher 
Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 302 (2006) [hereinafter Sturm, Architecture of Inclusion]  
(discussing how the National Science Foundation successfully incorporated diversity as a structural 
goal of the organization). 
 97. Id. 
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underlying problems of inadequate accountability built into the structure of man-
agement responsibility.  For example, one case involved an employee, Taylor, 
who was complaining about a decision to deny her leave.  Taylor had followed the 
informal practice for requesting leave, although she had not actually submitted a 
formal request.  In the past, the informal practice was sufficient, but this time, the 
leave was denied.  The initial trigger for the problem was a conflict with another 
employees leave request, and Taylors perception that this employee was favored 
because of a personal relationship with Lee, the manager.  The prior relationship 
dictated the outcome because Lee operated with unfettered discretion in the office 
and was not supervised or held accountable for any of her decisions.  She regu-
larly abused that authority.  She was able to function without any accountability 
because her supervising scientist was focused on research, which was the aspect 
of the work for which scientists were valued, and did not spend much time on 
administration.  The issue had not come to anyones attention because the em-
ployees were afraid to complain to Lees director, who delegated everything to the 
manager, so the issue would simply find its way back to Lee.  Employees were 
concerned that Lee would retaliate against anyone who raised issues about the 
managers performance.  This problem can be particularly difficult to prevent 
when race and gender differences are involved in the interaction. 
CCR traced these management problems to several deeply embedded organ-
izational practicesthe system for evaluating employees, the fear of grievances 
that discourage managers from giving ongoing feedback, the lack of effective 
systems for addressing conflict within the work group, and the silo structure for 
managing science.98  In the context of particular work groups, CCR has been able 
to reframe individual conflicts to make visible the underlying problems with the 
structure of leadership.  For example, through group facilitation, CCR has 
changed the frame for understanding a case from a problem with a particular 
worker to a problem with the communication and feedback from the leadership 
and inadequate mechanisms for raising issues within the work group.  When this 
reframing occurs, it has prompted the development of communication norms and 
processes for raising issues and taking stock within the work group.  This work 
typically occurs within the confines of a particular lab, branch, or program, and 
does not typically generalize across the organization.  This is not necessarily prob-
lematic because the solutions generated often need to be tailored to a particular 
micro-culture within the larger organization. 
When management issues cannot be addressed within the context of the work 
group, structural interventions have not taken root.  Efforts to intervene at an or-
ganizational level concerning the issues of management culture have proven more 
challenging.  CCR has brought these dynamics to the attention of the organization, 
and attempted several major initiatives that would enable the organization to ad-
dress the problem through organizational redesign.  Interventions to improve the 
fairness and efficacy of management within particular units have sometimes 
worked, including efforts to create governance systems that construct learning 
relationships at the outset of new collaborations or programs.  CCR has reported 
___________________________  
 98. This decentralized structure creates distinct work groups with separate governance structures and 
little communication with other departments, laboratories, and projects involved in related work.   
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that efforts to deal with these problems at the overall organizational level have yet 
to materialize. 
The capacity to address structural problems at a structural level is itself dy-
namic and changing.  In effect, CCR did a root cause analysis of why their efforts 
to engage management in addressing management culture failed.  They also 
looked at other arenas where serious problems occurred and became an occasion 
to improve practice.  They determined that although there was resistance to ad-
dressing the cultural or managerial dynamics head on, CCR could enlist organiza-
tional leaders in a process of self-reflection about their failures.  This process 
might then lead the actors themselves to identify the roots of the recurring prob-
lems, and enlist them in making more structural changes.  Howard Gadlin recently 
proposed to the executive officers, the highest level of non-scientific managers, 
that they participate regularly in a kind of morbidity and mortality (M & M) re-
view like those used in hospitals to address iatrogenic failures.99  This intervention 
moves beyond employee- or manager-initiated conflict as the trigger for root 
cause analysis.  Nothing compelled the executive officers to respond favorably to 
this proposal.  But more than half of the executive officers attended the first M & 
M that CCR hosted.  CCR is now conducting M & M sessions on a regular basis.  
The office will be taking difficult cases, where the outcome of a managerial action 
was different than intended, and guiding the executive officers through a root 
cause analysis.  Instead of having that analysis done within CCR, groups of organ-
izational actors will conduct the analysis, with the facilitation of CCR. 
The move to the systemic level seems to generate the most engaged organiza-
tional response when it is driven by the demands of science, particularly in the 
context of scientific collaboration at different levels of activity that require recon-
figuring relationships to produce successful scientific work.  This is the domain in 
which CCR has been most successful in addressing systemic problems through 
systemic intervention. 
The problems described in this section illustrate quadrant III of the matrix
where problems are diagnosed as systemic but addressed only at the individual 
level.  This quadrant most vividly highlights a potential gap between the levels of 
analysis and intervention.100  The possibility of such a gap, though inelegant and 
destabilizing, is important.  Participants in the conflict can raise systemic issues 
without committing themselves to undertaking them before they have fully as-
sessed the costs, risks, and potential for success.  This possibility reduces the risks 
and costs associated with asking the systems question.  The gap between analysis 
and intervention also marks a problem as systemic, and thus changes how the 
problem will be perceived when it recurs.  Quadrant III is where one sees the con-
sequences of failing to address systemic problems.  These failures are not just 
abstractions, but insistent problems affecting the quality of work and the quality of 
life within the organization.  The process of developing a systemic diagnosis de-
velops knowledge about the problem.  It also gradually builds understanding of 
the need for change among different stakeholders within the organization.  As 
___________________________  
 99. See Gawande, supra note 75; see also Laura M. Lee, Root Cause Analysis, Feb. 24, 2006 (un-
published presentation on file with author). 
 100. See supra Figure 2. Conflict Resolution Matrix. 
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CCRs root cause analysis of management culture illustrates, the capacity and 
openness for systems change can thus develop over time. 
4.  Structural Problem, Structural Intervention 
The failed collaboration.  Early in the history of CCR two scientists asked for 
help in resolving a dispute over the order of authorship for a paper they were 
about to publish.  Each believed that he deserved to be the first author, typically 
the position that gives one the most recognition.  In the course of working with the 
two scientists, the ombudsman was struck by the absence of personal animosity 
between them.  In addition, when inquiring about the origins of the dispute, the 
ombudsman learned that the scientists had not discussed their mutual expectations 
when they began their collaboration.  Sharing an interest in the research topic and 
recognizing the complementary nature of their respective areas of expertise and 
abilities, they had simply assumed all would work out.  They had not discussed 
the question of authorship or how they would handle the regular transactions and 
decisions that are part of collaborative research.  Building on the strong personal 
and scientific bond between the two, the ombudsman was able to resolve the mat-
ter by helping them identify some independent criteria by which the authorship 
matter could be fairly decided.  In the course of many interactions with scientists, 
CCR learned that it was fairly common for scientists to begin collaborations with-
out making explicit their expectations of one another, and without developing a 
process for resolving any differences that might arise.  Often these collaborations 
involved individuals with unequal status and power.  The case of the failed col-
laboration alerted CCR to the potential value of intervening at a systemic level to 
address systemic issues embedded in work routines and the culture of science. 
This case illustrates the final quadrant of the matrix, which involves systemic 
problems that are addressed by systemic solutions.  These are problems that come 
to be understood as systemic, and for which interventions match the level of 
analysis.  The area of scientific collaboration offers an example of a problem that, 
through its case work, CCR has come to understand as systemic and has been able 
to provide multi-level interventions that reach those systemic dimensions. 
Collaboration lies at the center of much scientific work.  Collaborations in-
volve scientists who are peers, as well as those at different stages of their careers.  
A host of issues can erupt in the course of these collaborations, including issues of 
authorship, ownership of data, and the scope and direction of the research.  These 
issues can be particularly fraught when they arise in the context of a mentoring 
relationship between a post doctoral fellow and a staff scientist.  The issue of 
problematic relationships between post docs and mentors is a recurring one, aris-
ing over and over again in CCRs individual cases.  Gender, racial, ethnic, and 
cultural differences can further complicate the problems that almost inevitably 
arise in the course of the relationship.101 
Over time, CCR has learned the ways in which these issues are built into the 
structure of the relationship, and also lie at the center of core scientific goals.  
Collaboration among scientists with different levels of experience and expertise 
lies at the heart of NIHs mission.  But it also carries with it built-in tensions, 
___________________________  
 101. See generally KATHY BARON, AT THE HELM: A LABORATORY NAVIGATOR (2002). 
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issues, and opportunities for abuse of power.  There is a fundamental imbalance 
in the relationships between post docs and lab chiefs.  We can do things to miti-
gate that, but we can never change the basic situation.102  The challenge is to 
figure out how one does work with this power differential for which there is no 
cure.  Gender, race, and national origin can intersect with mentoring issues.  The 
dynamics that produce conflicts and unfair outcomes also affect the capacities and 
trust of the parties in negotiating resolutions to those conflicts.  So, working out 
the specific problems depends in part on addressing the conditions producing that 
conflictcreating an atmosphere of trust, building the capacity of the low-power 
party to negotiate effectively, articulating principles for the relationship that eve-
ryone agrees to, and providing some form of accountability for the way the rela-
tionship proceeds.  Issues that have come up in this relationship include conflicts 
about the direction of the research, use and ownership of the data, who owns the 
data, authorship, exchange of biological materials, and whether post doctoral fel-
lows can take data or research with them when they leave NIH.  Complicating this 
issue is the fact that the post doc is dependent upon the mentor for professional 
development and future positions. 
So, for example, some cases involve postdoctoral fellows recruited to work in 
labs on collaborative projects, who are given then inadequate support and feed-
back, and because they do not rise to the challenge, come to be viewed as a 
warm body who can perform routine work, but who will never advance.  The 
resulting conflicts are often interpreted as personality issues.  Some cases have 
raised issues about favored fellows in the lab, sometimes because the post docs are 
from the same country or region as the leadership, and speak the same language or 
dialect.  Sometimes the relationship is further complicated by gender dynamics, 
particularly when women are not well-integrated into the social relationships of 
the lab.103  Issues also come up in other cases about authorship.  There are dis-
agreements about whether the post doc should be included as an author, and if so, 
whether they should be first, second or third author.  Fellows often interpret this 
decision as a power play by the senior scientist.  Gender and sometimes national 
origin may also come into play in shaping how managers interpret the cause of the 
problems. 
Over time, CCR has intervened in hundreds of cases involving conflicts about 
scientific collaboration.  They have acquired a sophisticated understanding of the 
evolution and structure of these conflicts.  They also have developed strategies for 
enabling collaborators to identify their underlying goals and develop a structure 
and set of principles to guide their work.  They essentially help scientists create a 
constitution to guide their activities.104  Mostly, this constitution involves a set 
of processes or questions that the parties would be required to work through as 
part of constituting their relationship.  But CCR also developed over time an un-
derstanding of some of the shared norms governing collaborations among differ-
ent types of scientists that could help parties to structure fair arrangements for 
matters such as sharing data and determining authorship. 
___________________________  
 102. Interview with CCR Ombuds, in Bethesda, Md. (Jan. 8, 2004) (on file with authors). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Howard Gadlin & Kevin Jessar, Preempting Discord: Prenuptial Agreements for Scientists, 
THE NIH CATALYST, May-June 2002, available at 
http://www.nih.gov/catalyst/2002/02.05.01/page6.html. 
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CCR hypothesized that many disputes could be avoided and collaborations 
made more productive and fair from the outset if the participants actively ad-
dressed the structure of their relationship.  By developing a protocol to help col-
laborators establish a framework for their working relationship, they were able to 
structure a set of processes and principles for addressing unanticipated conflicts or 
problems that arise over the course of the relationship. 
Initially, CCR used this structure in working with people who were already in 
conflict.  They subsequently developed a tool that could be used prospectively, 
and made that template available on the NIH website.105  They wrote articles and 
gave talks about the use of collaboration agreements.106  Scientists and institute 
directors learned of these presentations, and began to explore the use of collabora-
tion agreements in redirecting dysfunctional collaborations and as a way to set up 
fair and effective working relationships from the outset.  They invited the om-
budsmen to develop materials for general use and for training purposes, and to 
participate in the orientation and training of new post docs and mentors.  The om-
budsmen were then invited to facilitate retreats for those work groups interested in 
using the collaboration agreement as a framework for their working relationships.  
They used these occasions, as well as the principles and processes developed 
through their conflict resolution work, to facilitate the development of a set of 
norms and processes governing collaboration within particular work groups.  As 
collaboration has become more and more central to the NIHs sense of the future 
of science, the work generated through the collaboration agreements has expanded 
in its scope and impact.  Most recently, CCR worked with a group of scientists 
who used the collaboration agreement framework to develop a research center 
designed to facilitate collaboration among scientists from several different insti-
tutes. 
These collaboration agreements help scientists formulate a set of norms for 
practice, as well as institutionalize processes that structure communication and 
interaction to prevent or address future problems.  Through the device of collabo-
ration agreements utilized at different levels of organizational practice, CCR is 
engaged in making explicit a set of implicit or underspecified norms and in articu-
lating a set of norms where none have existed.  Many of these norms have been 
understood and expressed idiosyncraticallyfor example, the basis of trust in a 
scientific relationship.  When scientists enter into a collaboration project, they 
take certain things for granted, although these understandings often remain im-
plicit and there is little beyond professional socialization to hold people account-
able for adhering to them.  Scientists are trying to negotiate the complexities both 
of the scientific work and the working relationship.  They often agree in principle 
with norms providing that data will be fully shared and exchanged, communica-
tion will be balanced, decisions should be made mutually and based on the power 
of argument rather than the power of position, and credit is supposed to be allo-
cated fairly.  These understandings are filtered through scientific discourse as well 
as through the power dynamics in the collaborative relationship.  Scientists typi-
cally do not think about the relational dimensions of their collaboration.  They are 
___________________________  
 105. See Ombudsman, Questions for Scientific Collaborators, 
http://www4.od.nih.gov/ccr/collab.html. 
 106. See, e.g., Gadlin & Jessar, supra note 104. 
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thinking primarily about the science and the need to publish, enhance reputations, 
and advance knowledge.  They must depend upon each other for their individual 
areas of expertise.  Uniform rules specified in advance will not necessarily match 
the particular fairness issues that arise in the course of the collaboration.  The goal 
motivating collaboration agreements is for public understandings and practices to 
prevent extreme situations of abuse, and for applicable norms to connect in a 
meaningful way to the day-to-day dilemmas that people face in their collabora-
tions. 
When the sharing or exchange of biological materials is involved, scientists 
are required by law to enter into a formal agreement about the exchange of bio-
logical samples,107 but formal law does not address the full range of potential 
problems that often arise in the interaction among people with different perspec-
tives and power.  By institutionalizing the practice of using collaboration agree-
ments, CCR is exemplifying law as a set of practices and institutional arrange-
ments.  It enables the creation of a normative framework and relationships of ac-
countability for preventing and addressing wrongs that may not necessarily violate 
pre-specified rules or that can only be understood as problems in context.  Public 
values, such as addressing power imbalances, minimizing the expression of bias, 
and fairly allocating credit, are enacted within the context of the collaborative 
relationship, with accountability provided through the norms generated by analyz-
ing many other such relationships and through the involvement of third parties 
who can engage in identifying the source of problems that emerge in the context 
of practice. 
The following example further illustrates the dynamic relationship between 
the individual case and systemic change.  This example began with a case in 
which CCR was not intending to make a systemic intervention.  The ombudsmen 
thought they needed to address the issues between the direct parties to the conflict 
before reaching the systemic questions clearly implicated.  The case involved two 
scientists, one of whom was a lab chief to the other.  Both are independent inves-
tigators with their own budget; the lab chief function is more administrative and 
pro forma than it is substantive.  These two scientists were doing work in the same 
laboratory, though not in the same physical lab space.  A variety of tensions de-
veloped between them.  The junior person suspected that the senior person was 
working against his interests.  The more senior person suspected that the more 
junior person was not willing to accept his role as lab chief and that the junior 
scientist did not like him.  Distrust increased with every passing week, and with 
each decision that had to be reviewed.  There were allegations that the junior sci-
entist was keeping secrets about a scientific project from his colleagues.  Although 
this did not necessarily violate any ethics or disciplinary rule, it did violate shared 
implicit norms within the lab.  The issue of sharing information about research is 
an ongoing issue in every laboratory in which people are colleagues in the work 
but competitors in obtaining grants and advancing reputations.  A lot of attention 
___________________________  
 107. See CRADA, Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, which Congress required 
under the Federal Technology Transfer Act (FTTA). Exec. Order No. 12,591, Fed. Reg. 13,414 (April 
22, 1987), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 3710 et seq. (1986). See NIH Office of Tecnhology Transfer, What 
is CRADA?, available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/cradas/crada.html (description of CRADA and its use 
at NIH). 
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was paid to whether the secrecy warranted bringing ethical or misconduct charges, 
and a determination was ultimately made not to bring such charges. 
The two scientists turned to CCR for help because the junior person was 
thinking about leaving, which would mean the end of the lab.  Senior management 
did not want the lab to break up because it had a distinctive and valued configura-
tion of expertise.  They instructed the parties to try to find a way to resolve their 
antagonism, which was affecting others in the lab.  The scientists were also of 
different nationalities and, though these issues were not at the center of conflict, 
they were affecting their capacity to communicate with each other.  CCR talked 
with them about organizational issues affecting the whole program.  Though the 
lab chief did not actually hire the junior scientist, the junior scientist had been 
placed in the lab chiefs lab.  The junior scientists loyalties were thus to the per-
son who hired him and, when unhappy, he would turn to this person, while the lab 
chief turned to a different superior for support or influence. 
CCR had a series of discussions with them both separately and jointly.  The 
goal was to forge an agreement that would explicitly lay out the terms of the rela-
tionship between the two scientists: what issues the lab chief could legitimately 
raise, how to schedule meetings between them, how requests for resources would 
be handled, how they would cope with possible competition in their research or 
for outside funding, how they would address conflicts, etc.  It was clear to CCR 
that each issue was symbolic of the superordinate issues of power and autonomy. 
This conflict produced a long and difficult negotiation.  With each iteration of 
a possible agreement, CCR was finding the need to be more and more explicit and 
clear.  The need for that kind of clarity made CCR doubt whether the parties 
would be able to uphold any agreement, no matter what the terms.  The need for 
great detail pointed to an underlying distrust and dislike that was so profound that 
either party could find a violation of agreement based on a technical detail. 
Although these negotiations were confidential, everyone in the program knew 
about the tension and conflict. Through the initiative of the junior person, these 
issues were raised as part of the planning of a retreat for their program.  CCR had 
spoken with the parties about whether it would be useful if the program itself had 
specific guidelines about the role of a lab chief, as well as the role of a tenure 
track scientist working under that chief.  While there are general guidelines about 
the roles of lab chief and principal investigator on the NIH website, they are so 
general that they do not help in preventing or addressing possible disputes.  This 
policy issue, however, was set aside, and attention was instead focused on work-
ing out the particulars of a collaboration agreement between the lab chief and the 
scientist. 
At the retreat, the two scientists brought up the general issue of the lab chiefs 
role.  The entire lab group wound up clarifying for the whole program almost all 
the issues that were posed in individual form for the two scientists.  They also 
identified a set of additional issues or problems for which additional clarification 
was necessary.  They agreed to have follow-up meetings to generate lab-wide 
solutions.  The junior scientist compiled and circulated notes from the meeting.  
The group tweaked the language, and produced a document reflecting their collec-
tive agreement and understanding among the group about how they will do busi-
ness in the future.  The two scientists who were parties to the original dispute then 
arranged a meeting with CCR to discuss these developments.  Once these general 
agreements and processes were in place, the original disputants both felt they no 
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longer needed a personal agreement addressed specifically to them.  They felt 
their issues were more appropriately addressed through the structure that they had 
helped put in place for the whole lab.  CCR observed that there was a level of 
relaxation and ease in their conversation not witnessed before.  The protagonists 
body language and tone of voice were different; they were speaking to each other 
rather than to the ombudsmen.  They acknowledged that they still have a ways to 
go before they trusted each other, but felt that they had a fair and effective way to 
address their issues going forward. 
CCR predicts that this intervention will have an impact on the whole pro-
gram.  It may spread through the culture as a modelnot because it was adopted 
as a rule, but because it acknowledges the need for co-workers to be explicit and 
to have common norms to govern their interactions. 
The kinds of norm elaboration within NIH described here also occur across 
organizational boundaries.  The ombuds are part of larger professional groups that 
regularly share knowledge about their work.  So, for example, Howard Gadlin is 
actively involved in shaping the practice of ombuds offices within the federal 
government and nationally.  This framework for collaboration has been extended 
to other organizational environments.108 
IV.  THEORIZING THE FEATURES ENABLING INDIVIDUAL CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AND SYSTEMIC CHANGE 
The matrix developed in the previous section maps the dynamic relationship 
between individual and systemic conflict resolution.  The examples documented 
here do not fit neatly into the conventional dichotomies that have governed the 
analysis of conflict resolution.  They both resolve individual, private disputes and 
generate systemic solutions and public norms.  The choice is not either/or, once-
and-for-all, but when, under what circumstances, and how best to mediate the 
relationship between individual and systemic conflict resolution.  Linking individ-
ual and systemic conflict resolution, when structured to assure accountability and 
independence, enhances the capacity to produce successful individual outcomes 
and systemic improvements.  Conflict resolution in these examples is thus simul-
taneously informal and formal, problem-solving and norm generating, private and 
public, individual and systemic, collaborative and principled, and confidential and 
accountable. 
The practical and theoretical significance of this example depends upon its 
generalizability in two senses.  First, can the CCR case study be more broadly 
applied to other settings?  Its success cannot depend upon the particular configura-
tion of features present in this case study (i.e., a public agency devoted to science 
with an interdisciplinary office of highly respected conflict resolvers).  Second, 
does the matrix analysis have broader theoretical implications for how conflict 
resolution advances rule-of-law values? 
This section addresses these dimensions of generalizability.  First, it extrapo-
lates from CCRs work in order to identify the elements of a conflict resolution 
___________________________  
 108. For example, CCRs collaborative agreement approach has been adopted by the University of 
Minnesota. See University of Minn., Student Conflict Resolution Center, 
http://www1.umn.edu/sos/Research/research.htm. 
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process that integrates conflict resolution and systemic change.  These elements 
include: (1) a boundary-spanning institutional intermediary, (2) root cause meth-
odology, (3) institutional legitimacy within relevant communities of practice, and 
(4) participatory accountability.  This analysis provides a framework for critically 
evaluating the capacity of a conflict resolution program to link individual conflict 
resolution to systemic questions.   It then shows that these elements are not unique 
to CCR or present in all (or even most) ombuds offices. Using a functional analy-
sis, this section identifies programs with these features across the conflict resolu-
tion spectrumin judicial settings, administrative agencies, and some privately 
managed, publicly charged conflict management systems. 
A.  A Boundary-Spanning, Institutional Intermediary 
One of the qualities enabling a conflict resolution body to link individual and 
systemic work is its position as an institutional intermediary located at the inter-
section of multiple, interrelated systems.  CCR occupies such a position; it is an 
embedded but independent office nested within one or more communities of prac-
tice.109  CCR works with a variety of offices within NIH, and also works with 
employees who interact with those same offices in the context of doing the work.  
They are thus in a position to observe patterns in the way different offices perform 
their role, in the types of tensions and conflicts within those offices, and in their 
interactions with others.  Sometimes, these patterns can be traced to the way a 
particular office is organized.  Because CCR can observe similar dynamics across 
different cases involving the same office, it can sometimes trace the roots of or-
ganizational conflicts and dysfunctional relationships among offices within NIH. 
Institutional intermediaries address problems arising within defined systems 
that involve repeat players whose conduct affects those within the system, even if 
they do not regularly and directly interact.  Their boundary-spanning position 
affords access and knowledge concerning the range of problems that arise within 
that overall system.  Because they operate within defined practice domains, over 
time they confront problems that recur within that domain.  Institutional interme-
diaries also interact with and have an opportunity to observe repeat players over 
time.  They operate at the intersection of multiple governance systems, seeing the 
relationships among those systems.  By working with these communities of prac-
tice, they are in a position to generate norms, processes, and remedies that have 
___________________________  
 109. Communities of practice are groups of people who are active participants in the practices of a 
social community, interact with each other on a regular basis, and construct their activities and identi-
ties in relation to that community. ETIENNE WENGER, COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: LEARNING, 
MEANING, AND IDENTITY 4 (1998).  They could include a unit of an organization, a work group, or a 
professional association.  These social groupings could also be considered norm communitiesgroups 
of people who cooperate and compete, and in the process generate and enforce norms. See Robert 
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New 
Law Merchant, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1643, 1645 (defining a community as a social network whose 
members develop relationships with each other through repeated interactions.); ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORHOODS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). See Sturm, 
Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 96, at 312-22 (discussion of the role of institutional intermediar-
ies outside conflict resolution). 
File: 462DEC6C-3A12-28F60E.doc Created on:  4/23/2007 7:11 PM Last Printed: 4/24/2007 4:05 AM 
40 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2007 
 
an impact beyond a particular case.110  They also cultivate communities of practice 
as learning systems.111 
Crucially, institutional intermediaries are both embedded and independent.  
They are located outside the normal chain-of-command, and they work with actors 
in many different parts of the system.  Institutional intermediaries do not have 
particular governance or organizational duties that tie them to particular routines 
or lines of authority.  They operate independent of outside supervision over how 
they define and address problems.  CCR, for example, is set up to foster trust in its 
independence, impartiality, and integrity.  When he was brought in to create the 
program, Howard Gadlin was given full authority to establish an ombuds office 
according to the vision and practice that he believed would be successful.  The 
offices independence has been part of the social pact with the organization, and is 
built into the cultural understandings and routines of the organization since CCRs 
inception.  No one is permitted to dictate what CCR works on, who they speak to, 
how they do their work, or what they recommend.  This insider/outsider status is 
one important factor positioning the office to connect conflict resolution to struc-
tural intervention over time. 
Institutional intermediaries boundary-spanning location and role equips them 
to connect information, people, and problems.112  This position at the nodal point 
of multiple systems provides a vantage point for observing patterns and bringing 
that knowledge to bear on particular problems.  The capacity to understand and 
identify systemic problems develops over time from individual case work.  Con-
versely, the capacity to understand and address individual conflicts requires a 
systemic understanding that comes from the opportunity to step back and address 
problems outside the context of a particular conflict.  An intermediarys effective 
involvement in one context often produces occasions to address similar problems 
that arise at another time or location.  This work produces cultural and institu-
tional knowledge that intermediaries can draw on over time in spotting patterns, 
analyzing dynamics, and enlisting participation of relevant actors.  This permits 
different forms of aggregation, which can be tailored to the nature of the problem 
as well as the pragmatic opportunities for intervention. 
Institutional intermediaries are in a position to work at the level of the organi-
zation and with the parties that fit the contours of the conflict or problem.  They 
can bring people to the table who do not ordinarily work together and do not oth-
erwise have easy access to each other.  A case may be resolved in the short run at 
the level of the individual, with no immediate consideration of its systemic impli-
cations.  Institutional intermediaries can use information obtained in the context of 
an individual case to understand and design solutions for systemic problems when 
the opportunity to do so arises.  They utilize a range of intervention strategies, 
which give them considerable flexibility and scope.  For example, CCRs re-
sponse to the failed collaboration included individual case intervention, devel-
opment of a template for collaboration agreements, training, and facilitation of 
group problem solving, organizational analysis and system redesign.  The multiple 
roles performed by CCR afford the opportunity to connect problems learned 
___________________________  
 110. Cf. Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1179 (2003). 
 111. See WENGER, supra note 108, at 15-17. 
 112. Cf. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 46-59 (2000) (describing the important role of 
connectors in promoting change). 
File: 462DEC6C-3A12-28F60E.doc Created on: 4/23/2007 7:11 PM Last Printed: 4/24/2007 4:05 AM 
No.1] Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change 41 
 
through individual case work to systemic change.  Its mandate and range of inter-
vention strategies provided the access and the tools to calibrate its intervention to 
the appropriate level. 
The impact of institutional intermediaries is multiplied when they are located 
within different communities of practice.  For example, CCR is nested within the 
decentralized institutes operating within NIH.  It is in a position to interact with 
groups of people who occupy the same professional position, such as scientists, 
institute directors, and nurses.  It is also part of the network of federal, university, 
and national ombuds offices, and thus is in a position to diffuse its practices to 
those communities.113  CCR staff members regularly speak at conferences and 
workshops about their approach linking individual and systemic change.114  The 
scientists with whom CCR works are accountable to broader professional commu-
nities, as well as a university network that is either directly or indirectly account-
able to NIH as a grantee.  As such, CCRs role as a conflict resolution intermedi-
ary can have a cascading effect on an interrelated set of norm communities, even 
though its formal mandate is limited to addressing conflicts that arise among in-
house NIH employees. 
CCR exemplifies an institutional intermediary located within a formal organi-
zation, as well as within several professional norm communities.  However, this 
institutional intermediary role is not limited to internal conflict resolvers.  Any 
conflict resolution office that operates within an ongoing normative system, at the 
nodal points of interlocking systems, could potentially operate as an institutional 
intermediary able to integrate individual and systemic change.   
Courts that focus on specialized areas of practice within defined geographic 
communities can play this role.  For example, criminal courts can be in a position 
to identify systemic problems emerging across a variety of cases, to step out of the 
conflict resolution mode, and to develop systemic solutions to address those prob-
lems.  Brandon Garrett has described this form of systemic intervention in the 
criminal justice system.115  Garrett observes that courts are repeat players in the 
criminal justice system, and that they supervise the intersection of each of the 
other institutional actors in their courtrooms.116  He documents recent innova-
tions in which courts have aggregated information and prompted systemic reform, 
either themselves or through the involvement of third parties such as innocence 
commissions and expert panels. 
Conflict resolution mechanisms, developed to address problems within par-
ticular service delivery systems, offer another example of an institutional interme-
diary.  A recent article by Nan Hunter describes the development of external re-
view systems set up to resolve disputes between patients and managed care or-
___________________________  
 113. There is, for example, the United States ombudsman association, 
http://www.usombudsman.org/en/references/public_sector.cfm, the international ombudsman associa-
tion, http://www.ombudsassociation.org/, and the ABA Ombudsman Committee, 
http://www.usombudsman.org/en/references/more_references/participation_on_aba_ombudsman_com
mittee.cfm. 
 114. In fact, Howard Gadlin and Kevin Jassar are presenting at the Annual Conference of the Interna-
tional Ombudsman Association in April 2007. See International Ombudsman Association, 2d Annual 
Conference, http://www.ombudsassociation.org/conference/documents/Conf_Finalrevd.2.pdf. 
 115. Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manu-
script at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=893552. 
 116. Id. at 13. 
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ganizations.117  These processes have produced an intermediary body that has the 
(as yet unrealized) potential to integrate fair treatment of individual cases with 
system-wide concerns such as quality of care and fair allocation of health care 
resources.  Administrative agencies, such as child welfare departments, have cre-
ated third party intermediaries who use case analysis to reveal information about 
systemic breakdowns and to intervene at both the case and the systemic level as 
part of, and independent of, the process of individual conflict resolution.118  These 
conflict resolution systems share the features of an institutional intermediary 
poised to integrate individual conflict resolution and systemic improvement.  In-
terestingly, these examples illustrate the interrelationship and blurriness of the 
boundary between formal and informal approaches.  Even courts, the epitome of 
formal process, are using the information gleaned through that adjudicative role to 
generate the possibility of systems change. 
Conversely, many alternative dispute resolution and mediation offices are not 
set up to function as institutional intermediaries.  Internal conflict resolution of-
fices may be located within a particular sector or office, such as human resources, 
and they may be directly accountable to management.119  They often have a more 
limited mandate and range of operation.  Other offices are set up only to do me-
diation, and they do not interact with anyone in the agency outside the context of a 
particular individual conflict.120  Many conflict resolution systems are not de-
signed to enable the development of ongoing interactions among repeat players.  
More than half the time, outside mediators are selected from external panels to 
handle particular disputes.121  By definition, these mediators lack institutional 
knowledge; nothing in their mandate or functioning equips them to obtain that 
knowledge through their casework or to provide feedback to the organization.  
Mediation performed in this way is non-norm-generating and non-systemic. 
B.  Root Cause Methodology: Enlisting Participants in Interrogating Un-
derlying Causes and Their Possible Solutions 
The methodology of analysis and intervention is a second crucial element 
enabling the connection of individual cases to underlying structures and systems.  
___________________________  
 117. Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 93, 128-32 (2006); see also Norman Daniels & James Sabin, 
Limits to Health Care: Fair Procedures, Democratic Deliberation, and the Legitimacy Problem for 
Insurers, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303 (1997). 
 118. Department of Human Services, CPPC, 
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/cppc/service_reviews/qsr_overview.html. 
 119. See Gadlin, supra note 43, at 12, 17, 21 (discussing the problems associated with merging con-
flict resolution systems with managerial imperatives); LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 
325. 
 120. See LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 168 (describing mediation as a distinct design 
component); Rowe, Integrated Systems, supra note 45, at 91-92 (describing mediation as a formalized 
process conducted privately between a mediator and two individuals frequently resulting in off the 
record settlements); Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the 
Ombuds Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 95, 130 (1996) (criticizing mediations design for its 
inability to involve others affected by problems solved through private mediation). 
 121. LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 186; JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: USING ADR WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 138 (2004) (neutrals from private 
organizations used 80 percent of the time in pre-complaint dispute resolution). 
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It is key that the inquiry proceeds through identification of reasons supported by 
available data, and that this process produces an understanding of the relationship 
between the individual and the systemic in a way that enlists the affected parties in 
developing and acting on that knowledge.122  Until they began reflecting on their 
systemic work, CCR did not have a name for their methodology.  They came to 
see this work as a form of root cause analysis.  Root cause analysis explores why a 
problem arose and persists by asking insistent questions that trace the problem to 
its source.123  Most conflicts are indicators of underlying, partially hidden prob-
lems within the surrounding organization or setting.  The initial framing of the 
problem tends to emphasize the most emotionally charged aspects of a dispute, 
and is often insufficient to accurately diagnose the problem and to figure out how 
to address it.  Critical reframing deepens the questions asked of a particular par-
ticipant and, when obvious explanations and remedies are insufficient, brings in 
new participants to engage in understanding and addressing the problem. 
This methodology structures inquiry about the nature of a problem and its re-
lationship to intervention strategies by continually prompting a series of questions 
about the appropriate scope and goal of an intervention:  What kind of problem is 
this?  Why is it considered a problem and by whom?  How does it relate to other 
problems you have seen?  What is causing this problem?  What would it take to 
remedy it here and for others?  What can be done about it now and in the future? 
The conflict resolver continually probes whether the questions as posed locate the 
problem at the level where it can be meaningfully addressed.124  Question-making 
itself becomes an intervention; it is a process of making sense of a particular con-
flict and its potential for remediation. 
This inquiry is a form of hypothesis generation and testing, performed by de-
veloping solutions, trying them out, and then stepping back to evaluate whether 
they work.  This process operates like a mini-laboratory; it entails successive ap-
proximations of analysis, which are then tested and validated by experience.  An 
intervention strategy emerges based on predictions derived from current under-
standing.  The intermediary then analyzes the consequences of that intervention.  
Some aspects of the working hypothesis might be disconfirmed.  This realization 
___________________________  
 122. Cf Paul S. Adler & Kim B. Clark, Behind the Learning Curve: A Sketch of the Learning Process, 
37 MGT. SCI. 267, 270 (1991) (developing a learning process model that shows how data is processed 
within the organization to create new understanding of the design and production process); MacDuffie, 
supra note 17, at 492 (describing the philosophy that when a person sees a problem, s/he is more 
likely to analyze it systematically, to communicate the problem more accurately to others in his/her 
team or work area, and to be motivated to find a preventive remedy.); see also Michael C. Dorf & 
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 299-300 
(discussing Macduffie and root cause analysis). 
 123. MacDuffie desribes root cause analysis as: 
the careful, iterative examination of possible sources and remedies of the problema process 
known as the five whys.  The answer to the first why is often based on the easily observable 
or familiar antecedents to its occurrence.  An attempted solution based on this relatively auto-
matic diagnosis is unlikely to be successful for long, because there are other root causes that 
are only uncovered with more whys.  
Id. at 494.  See Lee, supra note 99 (describing the process of asking repetitive why questions to 
drill down into cause as a way of  finding out what happened, why it happened, and what can be done 
to prevent it from happening again). 
 124. See supra notes 17, 61.   
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then prompts rethinking the hypothesis about what the problem is and how to 
address it. 
The matrix analyses illustrate this methodology of hypothesis generation and 
questioning the questions.  The spurned scientist, for example, initially described 
the negative employment decision as the result of a biased or arbitrary process.  
The conflict resolver posed a series of questions aimed at validating whether bias 
or unfairness was in fact operating, and continually peeled back the inquiry to see 
whether an undetected problem lay at the root of the negative employment deci-
sion.125  Similarly, in the case involving the denial of vacation leave, the conflict 
resolver continually reframed the questions to reach the institutionally rooted 
source of managerial arbitrariness.126  This kind of hypothesis testing draws on 
institutional, cultural, and professional knowledge about the dynamics of relation-
ships, organizations, and systems.  The analysis of the failed collaboration identi-
fied predictable flashpoints in a research relationship stemming from the structure 
of the relationship.  The intervention of the collaboration agreement grew out of 
CCRs hypotheses about the dynamics of research collaborations, which are con-
tinually revised in light of what they learn from new cases. 
This methodology builds systemic inquiry into the fabric of performing indi-
vidual case work.  CCR ombuds described a frame shift that occurred in their 
practice as they incorporated a systemic lens into their root cause inquiry, and this 
frame shift is noticeable in case reviews over time.  The process of listening for 
systemic underpinnings begins when they first meet with clients.  It affects the 
kinds of things they listen for and the kinds of questions they ask.  They ask his-
torical questions designed to trace back the problem to its source, to situate it in a 
broader context, to identify others who are affected by the problem, and to con-
sider the interrelationship of that problem with other aspects of the organization.  
When did the problem first arise?  Was there a time when it was different?  Did 
anything change in the person or organization?  What else was going on?  What 
else is happening?  Was anyone else affected by the problem or did anyone else 
experience the same thing?127  They also ask more systems-related questions.  
Who benefits most by the conflict?  Who is hurt most by the conflict, and what is 
its effect on other people?  They then analyze whether a conflict serves some un-
acknowledged organizational purpose, separate from whatever personal needs it 
expresses, and why that purpose has been pursued in a problematic manner.  They 
help relevant stakeholders assess whether that purpose is legitimate, and if so, 
whether it can be achieved through more productive means.  They ask questions 
about the steps the person might take to change the dynamic, and the steps others 
would have to take.  They ask about who else would need to be involved and what 
obstacles to change would need to be overcome. 
The intermediary gathers and validates information, both about the particular 
conflict and its larger context.  Importantly, it does this independently, drawing on 
its knowledge base, as well as through interactions with those directly involved in 
the conflict and those with knowledge about or a stake in the underlying issues.  
Often, this involves integrating interdisciplinary understandings of the problem, as 
___________________________  
 125. See supra section II.C.1. 
 126. See supra Section II.C.3. 
 127. The office has explored the complementarity between root cause analysis and systems ap-
proaches to family therapy, and their methodology has been influenced by both. 
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well as information about the problems impact on people in different positions.  
Similarly, the process of developing solutions emerges through interaction with 
relevant stakeholders, who must be directly engaged in that process.  It does not 
require that the participants themselves are self-reflective, although the process 
benefits tremendously when they are.  Indeed, many conflicts explode because the 
protagonists lack the capacity to surface and address underlying issues.  CCRs 
experiences show that participation in critical inquiry often prompts reframing, 
even when the participants would not reach those insights on their own.  Some-
times, participation in the process develops participants capacity to use root cause 
analysis in their routine work.  Indeed, some interventions are explicitly designed 
to help groups achieve that ability. 
As the examples discussed above illustrate, the effort to trace a problem to its 
source will often lead beyond the confines of a particular dispute.  As a result, this 
methodology necessarilyalthough not always explicitlycombines normative 
and instrumental inquiry.  Root cause analysis and critical reframing enable con-
flict intermediaries to figure out, as part of the process of problem solving, 
whether to treat a problem as discrete and limited to its participants, or as part of a 
broader pattern warranting more systemic intervention.  By moving to a more 
systemic inquiry, the process necessarily identifies a wrong that warrants a more 
generalized intervention.  This something could constitute a wrong because it 
violates shared understandings; it could be a wrong because the processes or rou-
tines in place violate those shared understandings; it could be a wrong because the 
shared understandings have never been made explicit, and when they are, they 
cannot withstand scrutiny. 
Interdisciplinarity enables conflict intermediaries to conduct root cause and 
systemic analysis.  People from different disciplines are predisposed to ask differ-
ent kinds of questions reflecting different explanatory theories and intervention 
strategies.  These differences in perspective can be achieved through the internal 
composition of an office or by involving those with relevant knowledge in the 
critical reframing process.  For example, CCR was deliberately structured to draw 
on multiple disciplines, both in its analysis of problems and in its intervention 
strategies.  It combines scientific, organizational development, legal, and psycho-
logical frames of inquiry.128  The operation of these multiple perspectives has a 
destabilizing impact on the inquiry; it fuels the hypothesis generating and ques-
tioning process. 
Root cause analysis encourages the parties to resolve conflicts by getting to 
their source, not just by finding a way to split the difference.  It provides a check 
against the tendency of conflict resolution to focus on the presenting issues, the 
urgent emotional needs, and the quick fix.  This framework creates a pragmatic 
tension between analysis and intervention.  One always asks the systemic ques-
tion, but one does not necessarily act at the systemic level.  Part of the process 
entails assessing the possibilities, risks, and costs of a systemic approach as part of 
a particular case or intervention.  Sometimes it turns out there is no systemic prob-
___________________________  
 128. Howard brings a certain sensitivity to the scientific mission and a commitment to critical refram-
ing.  Kathleen offers a counseling framework, emphasizing the power of relational systems in shaping 
interaction.  Doris comes to problems with a background in organizational systems and processes.  
Kevin brings advanced degrees in law and literature, thus combining literary, legal, and policy orienta-
tions.   
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lem, or at least not one that the organization and the larger society views as a 
problem.129  Sometimes proceeding at the systemic level would compromise the 
capacity to address an individual case.  Sometimes the protagonists do not want to 
address the underlying questions.  Sometimes the stakeholders needed to make 
systemic changes cannot be brought to the table.  Sometimes the issue is not well 
enough understood as systemic by the stakeholders to mobilize their commitment 
to addressing the problem.  Sometimes the issue is not (yet) enough of a priority 
for the organization to take on the resource and time commitment necessary for 
systemic change, at least for the moment.  Sometimes creative solutions can by-
pass dysfunctional systems.  Root cause analysis enables reflective practice, which 
in turn equips conflict resolvers to craft interventions to match the demands and 
possibilities of the situations they face. 
This root cause methodology forces a principled inquiry, both about the na-
ture of the problemwhy is it a problem and what is the justification for treating 
it as suchand about the level and scope of the solution.  It also requires factual 
support for a diagnosis and proposed intervention.  Intermediaries must justify 
their recommendations to those they are seeking to persuade.  In an individual 
intervention this will involve those who are the direct protagonists.  In a more 
systemic intervention it will involve all of those whose cooperation is needed to 
make the systemic intervention work and be perceived as legitimate.  This legiti-
mating process is crucial because the offices efficacy turns entirely on the persua-
siveness of their analysis.130 
In the CCR example, root cause analysis is incorporated into the practice of 
conflict resolution.  In a smaller office, this critical analysis could be constructed 
by involving outside researchers in reflective practice inquiry or forming collabo-
rative relationships with conflict resolvers in other offices.  Some institutional 
intermediaries in other settings have followed a similar course.  For example, in 
the social welfare context, innovative systems have created third party intermedi-
aries who use root cause analysis and reflective practice to engage caseworkers, 
administrators, and families in generating solutions to systems failure manifested 
at the level of individual cases.131  Other intermediaries have used similar method-
ologies for analyzing the patterns emerging from their individual conflict resolu-
tion work and for designing interventions that address systemic problems identi-
fied through this analysis.  In the criminal justice context, aggregative approaches 
employed by innovative criminal courts rely on pattern identification, investiga-
tion of systemic causes, and involvement of responsible institutional actors in the 
development of remedies.132  Systemic interventions driven by data and reflection 
about individual cases can be found in the descriptions of the methodology used 
by other institutional intermediaries in entirely different settings.  In all these con-
texts, the mode of inquiry connects conflict resolution to learning, learning to 
___________________________  
 129. For example, the relevant communities did not view the underlying cause identified in Johns 
caseuncreative scientists dont necessarily advanceas a problem requiring any change.    
 130. The example of the case in the individual analysis/individual intervention illustrates the point.  
See supra Section II.D. 
 131. See, e.g., Quality Service Review Overview: Improving Results for Children and Families, 
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/cppc/service_reviews/qsr_overview.html.  
 132. See Garrett, supra note 115, at 40.  
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reframing, and reframing to generating solutions that address underlying prob-
lems. 
C.  Institutional Legitimacy within the Relevant Communities of Practice 
The capacity to connect conflict resolution to systemic change depends on the 
professional and organizational stature of the institutional intermediary.  Partici-
pants in the conflict resolution process must be willing to work with the interme-
diary, which in turn requires that they have confidence in his or her integrity, 
knowledge, and judgment.  They must believe that the intermediary has sufficient 
influence to bring to the table the various actors whose participation is necessary 
to address problems.  This institutional legitimacy affords access to the institu-
tional knowledge (such as about managerial dysfunctions or collaboration prob-
lems) and opportunities to use that knowledge to prompt institutional redesign 
(such as the use of collaboration agreements as the basis for creating a new insti-
tute).  The office must have considerable stature and legitimacy across a wide 
range of organizational constituencies, operating at very different levels.133  A 
person of sufficient knowledge, expertise, skill, and gravitas within the relevant 
community must occupy the role.  The formal attributes of the positiontitle, 
level, salary, role, etc.also play a role in defining its stature and influence.  The 
stature and level also play a signaling function by communicating a view of the 
offices significance to the community within which it operates. 
So, for example, CCRs access and influence depends upon the leaderships 
expertise and stature.  Howard Gadlin is himself a trained scientist, with a track 
record as a faculty member and scientific researcher.  He gave up a tenured fac-
ulty position as an experimental psychologist to take on the role of ombudsman.  
His scientific background enables him to communicate in the language of science, 
with those at different levels of the organization.  He negotiated a position that 
places him at a very senior level within NIH and that also allows him to operate as 
an independent intermediary.  This location provided a high level of visibility; 
both upper management and lower level employees see his office as a resource.  
He also plays a leadership role within the national conflict resolution arena.134  
Thus, this intervention range, which is crucial to the capacity for systemic under-
standing, depends upon the offices legitimacy at each of these levels. 
Stature also affects the efficacy of institutional intermediaries operating in 
other domains.  Judges who are repeat players in the criminal justice system bring 
a high level of stature and credibility to their role as systems change agents when 
operating within the scope of perceived authority and competence.135  Similarly, 
panels of independent physicians and community advocates operating as third 
party intermediaries carry substantial weight and bring legitimacy to the process 
___________________________  
 133. The ABA standards for ombudsman also emphasize the importance of stature: An ombuds 
should be a person of recognized knowledge, judgment, objectivity, and integrity. ABA Standards, 
supra note 6. 
 134. For example, he has edited volumes of the Negotiation Journal, participated in drafting ABA 
resolutions on ombudsman, and is regularly invited to speak at national conferences.   
 135. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 115, at 63 (describing the role of judges, in addition to prosecutors 
and law enforcement officials, in restructuring the criminal justice system to better detect, remedy, 
and prevent errors.). 
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of conflict resolution and systems intervention.136  In contrast, sometimes an om-
buds or mediator lacks sufficient credibility within the community they must in-
fluence, either because they do not come to the position with the attributes that 
command respect or because the position has been marginalized within the com-
munity.137  Under those circumstances, the office lacks the social and intellectual 
capital often necessary to play an effective intermediary role. 
D.  Participatory Accountability 
Finally, the capacity to sustain this linkage of conflict resolution and systemic 
change over time requires mechanisms for providing participatory accountability.  
In this sense, accountability means having regular occasions for explaining and 
raising questions about practice and outcomes, and for evaluating, justifying, and 
revising ones practices in relation to the goals and principles behind the enter-
prise.138  The intermediaries must regularly engage in questioning by and account-
ing to others whose judgments must be taken into account in the doing of the 
work.  Accountability is important to check against abuses and bias, both in indi-
vidual intermediaries and in the overall process.  It also plays a crucial role in 
motivating the dynamic interaction between individual and systemic issues.  CCR 
demonstrates how participatory accountability can be institutionalized by engag-
ing peers in ongoing assessment and revision of their practice.  This process pro-
vides for accountability in the traditional sense: assuring impartiality and prevent-
ing abuse of office, corruption, and pursuit of private ends. 
Institutional intermediaries have considerable interaction over time with re-
peat players, and thus risk developing both positive and negative biases.  Bias 
could operate to distort how intermediaries interpret information or which inter-
ests they emphasize.  It could also create an imbalance in the quality of their inter-
actions with people in different institutional positions.  For example, there may be 
greater opportunity for repeat interaction with senior leadership of the organiza-
tion than with lower-level employees.  This greater contact and familiarity might 
skew the types of problems presented and the interests at stake.  The opportunities 
for self-deception in professional practice are great, particularly where the inter-
vener is providing services to people in vulnerable positions with limited choices 
and urgent needs.  The possibility for confusing intentions and impact in this work 
is also enormous.  Intermediaries must have a process to point out when bias may 
be operating, and to provide checks minimizing its influence on the process.  Ac-
countability is needed to operate as a check against personal prejudgments or sin-
gle-minded, cognitive frameworks that exclude important aspects of a problem.  It 
___________________________  
 136. See Hunter, supra note 117, at 134, 140-41; Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a 
Social Arena: Strategies for Action, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 292 (1994). 
 137. See Meltzer, supra  note 32, at 601-02; Lauren B. Edelman, Stephen Petterson, Elizabeth Cham-
bliss & Howard S. Erlanger, Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Affirmative Action 
Officers' Dilemma, 13 LAW & POLY 73-97 (1991). 
 138. See Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability, A Conceptual Framework 
(EURGOV) No. C-06-01, available at http://www.cpmmex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-
06-01.pdf; Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability without Sovereignty, in 
NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE US 395, 400-01 (Gráinne De Búrca 
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006). 
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assures that interveners cannot hide decisions that violate practice norms, so that 
they can learn from, and take steps to rectify, their mistakes. 
Accountability is also important as a basis for learning about problems that 
can be remedied, patterns that can help surface causes, and the potential for gener-
alizing to other contexts.139  By asking questions about choices and consequences 
of the work, accountability provides a basis for assessing performance in relation 
to process and outcome goals, which are themselves open to revision.  Tracking 
outcomes provides the basis for assessing whether the goals of the office are being 
met, and produces crucial systemic information about recurring problems or pat-
terns.  It provides the internal tension needed to resist the tendencies to focus on 
the most emotional, urgent, obvious, or superficial issue, leaving underlying 
causes unchanged.  Root cause analysis regularly involves conflict resolvers in a 
process of asking explicit questions about the types of questions they are asking 
and not asking.  This form of accountability is built into the process of doing the 
work, both to assure that criteria for evaluation assess what is actually valued, and 
to link feedback to ongoing (and unpredictable) practice.  It is also important that 
conflict intermediaries are accountable to the range of stakeholders who use the 
process, not just to the management or mediated through a single stakeholder. 
Accountability is particularly necessary and tricky for a conflict resolution 
practice bound by confidentiality requirements.  The experience with CCR shows 
the possibility of incorporating internal and external accountability into the doing 
of the work.  Intermediaries who lack decision-making authority or coercive 
power must give compelling reasons to enlist participation and generate effective 
solutions; their work thus provides a kind of built-in accountability.  Conflict in-
termediaries gain influence by providing reasons for their analysis and under-
standing of a situation, and by coming up with effective solutions.  This role en-
courages intermediaries to monitor the adequacy of their investigation, analysis, 
and follow-through.140  In this regard, ombuds lack of formal power enhances 
their accountability. 
An important source of this deliberative accountability comes from reflective 
practice work: regular, deliberative sessions conducted as part of strategizing 
about and critiquing the ongoing work of the office.  CCRs weekly case reviews 
and staff huddles exemplify this practice.141  Those sessions routinely analyze the 
choice points, strategies, and difficulties posed by the case at hand.  When we 
were developing the case review method, we worked hard to develop an atmos-
phere where people will surface mistakes.  It is very common for people to say, I 
am having a hard time with this, I really messed this up.142  These sessions often 
generate suggestions of a strategy or criticism of how something was handled, 
picking up on what might be perceived as a deviation from impartiality.  The 
stance is one encouraging the ability to work with disparate ideas simultaneously 
and integrate them as a way of critically evaluating the adequacy of ones own 
___________________________  
 139. See CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHON, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: A THEORY OF 
ACTION PERSPECTIVE 22 (1978); Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Eco-
nomic Development, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY (Neil Smelser & Richard Swedberg ed., 
1994). 
 140. Hunter, supra note 117, at 148. 
 141. See supra Section III.A.; Interview with Ombuds, in Bethesda, Md., (Feb. 28, 2002). 
 142. Meeting with CCR, in Berthesda, Md. (July 19, 2006). 
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position.  This methodology generates a high tolerance for difference and for si-
multaneously accommodating different ways of understanding a problem. 
CCR also uses reflective inquiry and critical reframing to learn about and re-
vise their practice: 
As we are going through cases, we are trying to draw systemic lessons.  
The reflective practice, merged with sensibility about systemic cases, en-
ables us to think about these cases.  We make connections across cases in 
case reviews regularly; we refer to commonalities and differences within 
particular kinds of cases.  It is more common than not, when someone is 
presenting a case, to have someone make a connection with a case that 
they presented or are working on.  It happens all the time.143 
Some form of external accountability is still important as a check against bias, 
groupthink, and corruption.  External accountability can be integrated into this 
process by bringing in outsiders to do reflective practice work with the organiza-
tion, and thus to provide them with regular feedback and frameworks for evalua-
tion.  In many respects, research operates as part of the offices reflective practice 
work, providing a form of external accountability by working over an extended 
time with a researcher who mirrors the kind of embedded independence and in-
sider/outsider dynamic that CCR strives for in its practice.  They have also worked 
intensively with a researcher using a reflective practice methodology inspired by 
Donald Schons work to increase their understanding of conflict dynamics and 
effective interventions.144  This model enables them to talk easily about mistakes 
and successes in a safe way.145 
Intermediaries interactions with their overall constituency and the public cre-
ate an additional, albeit weak, source of external accountability.  The responsibil-
ity to report and make recommendations on systemic issues provides a baseline 
against which to assess progress.  Willingness to use the office depends entirely 
on public perceptions of the offices efficacy and legitimacy.  Tracking usage 
rates over time shows how different constituencies are voting with their feet and 
provides an indirect form of accountability.  Also, it is possible for the office to 
track outcomes on systemic cases without violating confidentiality, thus providing 
a source of external accountability. 
Accountability could be enhanced by tracking information about individual 
cases over time.146  CCR, like most conflict resolution offices, does not (and is not 
permitted to) maintain systematic data about the progress of individual cases, even 
for purely internal purposes such as self-evaluation and pattern identification.  
Concerns about the possibility of forced disclosure through subpoena prevent this 
information from being maintained.  In fact, CCR destroys all notes on cases, 
retaining only demographic information reflecting general attributes of the con-
___________________________  
 143. Id. 
 144. DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 
(1983). 
 145. Id. at 2. 
 146. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 
962 (2006); Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact: The Quest for a New Paradigm for Account-
ability in Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 256 (2006). 
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flicts participants and type of problem.  Confidentiality around data retention and 
tracking is in fact a constraint on accountability.  It prevents the office from sys-
tematically analyzing quantitative data, and thus limits the opportunity to look at 
problems with categories not thought of when the data was gathered.  We lose a 
lot of fine detail.147  If conflict intermediaries had legal protections so that re-
cords could be kept without being subpoenaed, then confidentiality in the func-
tional sense could be preserved and still allow the office to learn more from its 
cases and self-monitor. 
There are additional ways to institutionalize accountability without abandon-
ing independence.  Accountability could be enhanced by periodic outside evalua-
tions, based on metrics designed to assess performance in relation to both individ-
ual and systemic goals.  This review could be performed by peersresearchers 
and practitioners with expertise in both the subject matter being addressed and in 
the area of conflict resolution.  It would be worth exploring the role of relation-
ships and methodologies that produce accountability by institutionalizing a proc-
ess of inquiry about those practices. 
V.  REEXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
AND RULE-OF-LAW VALUES 
This article began with an apparent dilemma.  Informal conflict resolution is 
increasingly prevalent, and all indications are that there is no turning back.148  Yet, 
these processes have prompted considerable criticism based on their purported 
compromise of widely accepted rule-of-law principles.149  Criticism of non-
adjudicative conflict resolution highlights the failure of these processes to advance 
the elaboration of general public norms through principled decision making.  Crit-
ics also express concern about the departure from principles of impartiality and 
about the absence of accountability for both the decisions and outcomes of these 
informal processes.  The gap between theories of legitimacy and practices of con-
flict resolution makes these new processes both unstable and more difficult to hold 
accountable. 
The matrix analysis developed here invites a reconsideration of the assump-
tions underlying this debate.  This section demonstrates that rule-of-law principles 
can be realized using non-adjudicative processes that integrate individual and 
systemic issues, at least under certain conditions.150  Informal conflict resolution 
processes can internalize those values without imitating adjudication, and doing so 
will enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of these processes.  The CCR case study 
is a springboard for developing a more dynamic understanding of these rule-of-
law valuesone that accounts for how they actually operate in different settings.  
___________________________  
 147. Meeting with CCR, supra note 142. 
 148. LIPSKY, SEEBER & FINCHER, supra note 1, at 319.  
 149. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 366-68; Daniels & Sabin, supra note 117, at 222-23; Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 410, 414 (1978); Luban, supra note 4, at 2622-26; Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative 
Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886-87 (1981); Susan Sturm, A 
Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1410-11 (1991).  
 150. See Luban, supra, note 4, at 2647 (an argument calling for such a jurisprudence of informal 
conflict resolution); Daniels & Sabin, supra note 117, at 222-23. 
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This approach provides a framework for assessing both informal and formal con-
flict resolution in relation to their realization of rule-of-law values.  It also chal-
lenges the idea that the methods used in adjudication are the only, and necessarily 
the best, way to realize those values across the board.  Finally, this analysis shows 
the importance of explicitly constructing the relationship between formal and 
informal systems of conflict resolution as a way of enhancing the legitimacy and 
efficacy of each. 
A.  Elaborating Public Values 
One of the core assumptions underlying the critique of ADR is its inability to 
advance public values through principled decision making.  This conclusion takes 
for granted a legalistic meaning and method for elaborating public values.  It pre-
sumes a particular idea of public decision makingthe formal declaration of gen-
eral rules by courts or legislaturesand a particular conception of how public 
values emerge from conflict resolutionthrough Socratic reasoning from binding 
precedent.151  These are important forms of public norm elaboration, but they are 
not the only principled way that public values can be articulated and generalized, 
particularly in contexts where the coercive power of the state is not directly impli-
cated.  As many theorists have shown,152 generalized norms are also developed 
outside the formal organs of the state.  They may apply beyond the scope of an 
immediate conflict, serve broad social purposes, meet shared expectations of le-
gitimacy, solve collective problems, and act authoritatively within a particular 
domain.  In these respects, these informal norms are public.     
Over time, informal public norms often influence formal policy and law, par-
ticularly as they gain currency through reiteration, coordination, and revalida-
tion.153  The processes of conflict resolution described above institutionalize a 
mechanism for this kind of normative development.  Linkage of individual con-
flict resolution and systemic change creates the capacity for informal conflict 
resolution to generate public values through principled decision making.  It can 
produce active engagement in public norm elaboration and transformation in non-
adjudicative settings. 
This conception of public norms builds on a rich foundation of scholarship 
challenging the adequacy of formalistic conceptions of law and articulating more 
constitutive, nuanced, and descriptively accurate depictions of public normative 
elaboration.  Conflict resolution and deliberative democracy scholarship has be-
gun to explore informal processes that are intentionally designed to  
generate and generalize public norms.154  Reva B. Siegels important article on 
___________________________  
 151. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term--Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Delib-
eration, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 33-40; Fiss, supra note 3, 1085; William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 240 (1978), cited in Luban, supra note 
4, at 2622. 
 152. See infra notes 165-168. 
 153. Reva B. Siegel eloquently analyzes a similar process of constitutional meaning-making in the 
context of the ERA. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitu-
tional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1340-41 (2006). 
 154. See, e.g., Paul R. Kimmel, Culture and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
453, 456 (Peter T. Coleman ed., 2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the 
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constitutional culture provides a language for understanding the dynamic relation-
ship among conflict, citizen engagement, and norm elaboration: 
Collective deliberation helps establish what things mean and why they 
matter. Collective deliberation is thus useful, not only as a procedure for 
deciding how to act, but also as a practice for articulating who we are. 
Collective deliberation forges the meanings through which individuals 
and communities can express identity, and infuses practical questions 
with symbolic significance so that they provide occasions for individuals 
and communities to vindicate values through which they define them-
selves.155 
Socio-legal scholars have also documented the laws constitutive character, 
depicting law as a reciprocal process in which actions and interpretations given 
by individuals to their worldand law and legal institutions as part of the lived 
worldbecome repeated, patterned, stabilized and these stabilized patterns be-
come part of the meaning system deployed by as well as constraining the individ-
ual.156  Recently, economic literature has used norms to explain a breadth of posi-
tive and normative issues, including the informal resolution of property disputes 
among rancher neighbors in Shasta County, the preference of the diamond indus-
try for non-legal means of contract enforcement, and the stability of racial dis-
crimination in competitive markets.157 
The combination of root cause analysis and multi-level remediation, illus-
trated in the CCR example, provides an example of deliberately designed proc-
esses of public norm elaboration outside of adjudication.  This methodology 
pushes stakeholders to make implicit norms explicit, and then involves them in an 
inquiry by which those norms are justified or rejected.  This norm elaboration 
happens as part of determining whether an issue is problematic, and if so, why and 
what can be done to change it.  The process of finding causes and assessing im-
pacts also poses the question of how others are potentially affected by a problem, 
and whether the opportunity to craft a more general solution exists and should be 
pursued.  Problems revealed through conflict resolution sometimes give rise to 
changes in policy, which apply to everyone similarly situated within the relevant 
domain.  The advancement of public norms also occurs through addressing institu-
tional dysfunctions that prevent their realization.  For example, the case involving 
the lab chief identified systemic problems in sharing information, power, and 
resources, which interfered with the quality of collaboration and produced unfair-
ness.  The process produced a general framework to guide the labs interactions 
and reduce arbitrariness and misunderstanding.158 
___________________________  
Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 572-73 (2006); Susan Opotow, Aggres-
sion and Violence, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 154, at 403, 415. 
 155. Siegel, supra note 151, at 1341 (internal citations omitted). 
 156. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Structure of Legality: The Cultural Contradictions of 
Social Institutions, in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY: ON THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP 
SELZNICK 149, 151 (Robert A. Kagan et al. eds., 2002). 
 157. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 132 (1992); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).   
 158. See supra Part II.C.4. 
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Public norms develop by using reports, deliberation, training, and group fa-
cilitation to figure out how to incorporate desired values into practice.  This line of 
inquiry leads to second order norms, which set up processes and principles to 
address new problems.159  Collaboration agreements, used to construct fair and 
workable research collaborations and to create a framework for addressing dis-
agreements, are perhaps the most vivid illustration of a constitutional form of 
public norm elaboration.160  They generate a set of norms from practice; they also 
institutionalize ways to prevent or address future problems.  Through the device of 
collaboration agreements, utilized at different levels of organizational practice, 
CCR helps NIH make explicit a set of implicit or underspecified norms and articu-
late norms where none have existed.  This methodology enables the development 
of public understandings and remedies that attach in a meaningful way to the day-
to-day dilemmas that people face in a collaborative research environment.  In the 
absence of a structure or a process, there is no way to articulate those understand-
ings or to hold people accountable for acting on them.  By institutionalizing the 
practice of using collaboration agreements, CCR is enabling the development of 
principled norms and accountability for addressing wrongs that may not violate 
pre-specified rules or that can only be understood as problems in context.  Here, 
law operates as a set of practices.  Collaboration agreements create occasions for 
elaborating values, identifying problems in advance, developing shared solutions, 
and holding people accountable. 
As the problems become better understood as recurring and preventable 
through institutional design, some interventions generate deliberations that pro-
duce an overarching governance structure built around principles, values, and 
lessons gleaned from conflict resolution experience with recurring problems.  
Sometimes they produce constitutional moments for the organization, when the 
collective participates in rethinking the framing principles and structures govern-
ing their work.  In this manner, public values emerge from a non-adjudicative 
process. 
The articulation of these public values draws on varied sources.  Formal law 
plays a role in several respects.  It establishes the boundaries of acceptable deci-
sion making and practice.  Relationships may not violate, for example, the rule 
about sharing biomedical research.  Employers must reasonably accommodate 
employees disabilities.  Legal principles cement the legitimacy of an abstract 
value, which must then be translated into practice.  Under some circumstances, 
formal law also influences how people interpret the meaning of particular values.  
This is particularly apparent in the area of race discrimination; ideas of race are 
heavily influenced by legal concepts of intentional discrimination. 
In many conflicts, formal legal principles do not adequately diagnose the 
problem or guide the process of determining whether there is an issue warranting 
more general attention.  Normative choices and meaning emerge from the active 
deliberation of participants in the problem-solving process; the participants must 
explain their perspective so that it can be understood by, and be persuasive to, 
others.  In doing so, these participants draw upon professional norms, community 
___________________________  
 159. See Adler & Clark, supra note 122, at 270; cf. H.L.A. HART, THE  CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (1961).  
 160. See supra Part II.C.4 (a more detailed description of the role of collaboration agreements). 
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norms, and widely shared ethical norms such as fairness.161  Conflict intermediar-
ies draw on analysis of past practice, tested by what works, in developing their 
understanding of a related issue and in reframing participants understandings of 
particular conflicts.  Analysis of patterns revealing dysfunctions also triggers in-
quiry about why a pattern posed a problem, whether the problem warrants more 
general attention, and how to address it. 
Thus, when linked to systemic change, non-adjudicative conflict resolution 
can foster the articulation of implicit norms, reasoned elaboration and visible 
expression of public values,162 public solutions to common problems, implemen-
tation of public norms, and engagement with the relationship between norms and 
remedies.163  Law thus operates as a catalyst by facilitating the elaboration and 
implementation of public values, and the productive engagement of normative 
inquiry among relevant institutional actors.  Rule-of-law values impose an obliga-
tion to articulate the basis for determining that a condition is sufficiently problem-
atic to warrant public attentiveness, and to justify the adequacy and appropriate-
ness of public actions.164  Conflict resolution thus institutionalizes principled deci-
sion making that can be generalized within the community of practice in which it 
operates. 
The objection might be posed, what is the legitimate basis for generalizing a 
norm developed through individual conflict resolution?  Generalization has been 
thought to require the formal protections of adjudication.165  This position assumes 
that norms can only be generalized by imposing them on others, either through 
another case or through a general rule.  We have seen, however, that generaliza-
tion can take place through substantive process rather than through the imposi-
tion of rules.  For example, generalization can proceed through reframing prob-
lems and thus expanding the scope and level of participation, convening a process 
to consider the implications of norms on larger systems, and participatory systems 
redesign.  Different kinds of processes are needed to justify these forms of gener-
alization than for norms generalized through rules.  More generally, the justifica-
tion for generalizing a norm depends upon the legitimacy of the process used to 
develop that norm, as well as the scope and consequences of its application.166  
Norm elaboration falls on a continuum of generality: from unarticulated to articu-
lated, to justified (or rejected), to shared with others, to institutionalized within a 
particular setting, to adopted in multiple settings, to embodied in a rule or practice, 
to generalized to other institutions within the community of practice, to adopted 
across domains, to embedded in published, enacted law.  The question of when it 
___________________________  
 161. An illustration of the role of norms can be found in the description of the process used in the 
intervention involving the decision not to select John for a new position. See supra Part II.C.1.  There, 
the questions driving the inquiry were informed by legal norms (whether the process was biased), 
community norms (whether scientific standards of merit were justified), ethical norms (whether the 
process was fair), and organizational norms (whether the process was reflective of deeper organiza-
tional dysfunction or collective dissatisfaction). 
 162. Luban, supra note 4, at 2626. 
 163. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 TermForeword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 9 (1983). 
 164. Susan P. Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 67-69 (2004). 
 165. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 20, at 328; Fiss, supra note 3, at 1075. 
 166. See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New 
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. (forthcoming Summer 2007) (manuscript at 7, on file with author). 
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is legitimate to apply a norm articulated in a particular conflict to other contexts 
and stakeholders depends upon where the process falls on this continuum. 
Here again, rule-of-law values can be built into the process used to decide 
when and to whom norms may be generalized.  If people are similarly situated 
with respect to a particular problem, fairness permitsindeed, often requires
more general application.  Root cause analysis builds in the requirement that gen-
eralization be justified, based on the identification of commonalities in experience, 
cause, and solution.  It also incorporates the participation of those affected by, 
responsible for, and knowledgeable about, the problems at issue.  Remedies can-
not be imposed through this process; they must emerge from this collective delib-
eration, propelled by the search for causes and solutions.167 
Of course, sometimes norms and remedies cannot be developed through this 
collaborative process.  Several examples of this can be found in the matrix discus-
sion.  For example, in the case of the spurned scientist, John did not accept the 
fairness and legitimacy of the decision not to award him the position he felt he 
deserved.  Sometimes crucial stakeholders are unable or unwilling to participate, 
or the conditions for crucial organizational redesign may not yet exist.  Sometimes 
participants want to solve the immediate problem and move on.  Quadrant III of 
the matrix demonstrates that some conflicts are not amenable to reframing as sys-
temic issues.  Some, for example, might involve serious wrongdoing warranting 
the use of coercion.  Coercion may be necessary to provide an end point for an 
ongoing conflict, to induce unwilling actors to take responsibility for addressing 
serious problems, to provide retrospective remedies for harms caused, or to take 
adverse action against an individual.  In these situations, advancement of public 
values cannot legitimately be achieved through institutional intermediation.168 
These limits focus attention on the interdependence of informal and formal 
conflict resolution systems.  Some problems are simple and recurring; experience 
with deliberative processes over time may show that a rule would, in fact, most 
effectively address that problem.  The processes used to impose rules could then 
be invoked.  Rules could emerge internally, through policy formulation, or exter-
nally, through state intervention.  Institutional intermediation operates in tandem 
with other forms of conflict resolution.  
This analysis suggests that formal and informal systems are mutually consti-
tutive, with capacities to generate public values for conflicts of different types.169  
They can generate norms with different types of legitimacy.  Norms generated in 
one domain affect those developed in the other.  They can compete with each 
other, co-exist, or enhance each others efficacy and legitimacy.170  The type of 
relationship among these systems can, and should, be deliberately and self-
___________________________  
 167. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 122, at 286; Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law 
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1428 (1991). 
 168. In CCRs work, for example, disputant preferences determine how a given matter is handled.  At 
any point a dissatisfied person can pursue any of the formal grievance and complaint processes avail-
able within the organization.  And every visitor to the office is always informed about the full range of 
formal and informal processes available for that persons particular issue. 
 169. Cf. David Trubek & Louise Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, 
Rivalry, or Transformation 2-3 (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 1022, 2006). 
 170. See JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 164-79 (2002); Men-
kel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 2, at 2676; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 169, at 3-5.   
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consciously constructed.  Thus, collaborative critical inquiry can generate public 
values through internal processes of participation and accountability.  Norms de-
veloped through processes attentive to rule-of-law values may carry greater 
weight in other conflict resolution arenas.  These processes cannot, however, gen-
erate norms binding beyond the scope of that community, at least not without 
further process.  Yet, the systems legitimacy is undermined if there is no effective 
backstop to address problems that cannot be resolved cooperatively, when those 
problems violate established norms and have consequences that fall heavily on 
particular individuals.171 
At the same time, the co-existence of these conflict resolution systems poses 
potential threats to the efficacy of each.  Sometimes, the capacity to cut deals in 
private, without regard to fairness or public consequences, undermines formal 
laws capacity to advance rule-of-law values.172  Conversely, formal legal rules 
and sanctions can undercut the capacity of intermediation to involve necessary 
participants, generate much-needed data, or produce genuine deliberations.173  
They can also unduly narrow the normative framework within which root cause 
analysis must proceed.  The contrast between anti-discrimination and disability 
norms illustrates this point.174  One of the examples provided for quadrant III of 
the matrix illustrates how antidiscrimination law and process can distort the frame 
for analyzing cases in which race may play a role.  The law imposes a fixed and 
unitary meaning of race discrimination; at the individual level it is defined by 
deliberate, unequal treatment based on race.  This legal framework dictates how 
race is understood; it discourages participants from addressing the racial dynamics 
producing exclusion, even when those legal standards do not apply.  Contrast this 
rigid, rule-based approach with the laws approach to disability.175  There, the 
legal standard of reasonable accommodation invitesindeed, requiresthe par-
ticipants to deliberate about the meaning of disability in context and to try to ad-
dress the consequences in the design of the workplace, at least with respect to that 
individual.176  This kind of legal standard combines the imperative of formal law 
with the dynamism of collaborative problem solving. 
___________________________  
 171. For example, research shows that proactive efforts to create effective systems for preventing 
sexual harassment are unlikely to work if clear violators of sexual harassment norms do not receive 
discipline. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 13, at 471-72 (citing Charles L. Hulin et al., Organ-
izational Influences on Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: 
PERSPECTIVES, FRONTIERS, AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 127, 131-34 (Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 
1996)).  CCR has an abiding interest in the NIH providing strong and effective grievance and com-
plaint mechanisms. 
 172. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 366; Luban, supra note 4, at 2626.    
 173. See, e.g., Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence, supra note 57, at 43; Sturm, Second Generation, supra 
note 13, at 475; Trubek, supra note 136, at 294-96. 
 174. We are grateful to Liz Emens for inspiring this comparison of disability and anti-discrimination 
norms. 
 175. Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 to provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.  
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 337 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).  
The ADA requires employers to provide qualified, disabled employees with reasonable accommoda-
tions unless a covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business of the covered entity. Id. § 12111(8), (9). 
 176. See Elizabeth Emens, Integrating Accommodations 5 (Nov. 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
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The discrimination/disability example illustrates a more general point.  Con-
flict resolution norms and processes in one arena can be designed to take account 
of their impact on public values developed in other conflict resolution systems.177  
This realization underscores the potential and desirability of actively negotiating 
the relationship among these informal and formal normative systems.  Legal 
norms could be articulated so that they foster conflict resolution designed to ad-
vance public values in other domains.  Informal conflict resolution could be de-
signed to enhance their capacity to advance public values by building in the fea-
tures linking individual conflict resolution with systemic issues.178 
B.  Rethinking Impartiality 
Impartiality is another important rule-of-law value that has figured promi-
nently in the conflict resolution debate.  The value of impartiality operates as a 
means of assuring unbiased and principled decision making.  It is intended to pro-
vide process integrity, which requires that the process is not stacked in favor of (or 
against) any participant.  This means that the third party is equally open to the 
concerns and arguments of all sides, and will not conduct the process from a pre-
determined point of view. 
The conventional view achieves impartiality through detached neutrality.179  
This means that, ideally, the third party should have no direct knowledge of the 
conflict or prior relationships with the participants.  This conception of impartial-
ity underlies a strand of criticism directed particularly at embedded conflict reso-
lution.180  The assumption is that impartiality can best be achieved by removing 
the conflict from the context within which it occurs, and limiting the potential for 
outside relationships or knowledge to taint the process.  This view would preclude 
embedded intermediaries, and thus challenges the legitimacy of a crucial feature 
enabling conflict resolution to generate public values.181  Detached neutrality 
would practically disable conflict resolvers from using systemic knowledge in 
their individual case work or from playing the multiple roles that enable systemic 
responses to problems surfaced by individual cases.  It would preclude the condi-
tions necessary for the linkage of individual and systemic intervention. 
An unbiased conflict resolver is a value crucial to process integrity.  How-
ever, detached neutrality is not the only, or even necessarily the best, means of 
achieving that end.  Even in adjudication, bias cannot be eliminated without taking 
account of its more structural forms.  It is now well understood that the haves 
come out ahead in the litigation process,182 and that every decision maker ap-
___________________________  
 177. See COHEN, supra note 168, at 164-79.  See Susan Sturm, Laws Role in Addressing Complex 
Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 
35, 54-56 (Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (a discussion of courts role in facilitat-
ing norm elaboration in informal communities of practice). 
 178. See supra Section IV. 
 179. See Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV 1, 14 (1979); Lon Fuller, The Adversary 
System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (Harold J. Berman ed., 2d ed. 1971); see also Judith Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 374 (1982). 
 180. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 3. 
 181. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text. 
 182. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
9 LAW. & SOCY. REV. 95, 97-98 (1974). 
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proaches a problem from a perspective that builds on unstated assumptions and 
baselines often favoring more powerful group members.183  Detached neutrality 
does not provide a way of detecting or protecting against these forms of bias. 
Detached neutrality has even less salience in non-adjudicative conflict resolu-
tion.  There, the third party does not impose outcomes, but instead frames the way 
the conflict will be addressed, including who is at the table and how they partici-
pate.  Impartiality requires that third parties do not privilege any party or point of 
view in that process.  They must assure that the process is fair and open, and that 
every relevant stakeholder can participate meaningfully and fully.  Unbiased proc-
ess requires that every participant has the capacity to influence how issues are 
framed and solutions are developed.  To achieve this goal, a third party requires 
sufficient knowledge and access to identify relevant people who have been ex-
cluded or undervalued in the framing of the issues, and to provide a means for 
their effective participation.  This demands ongoing interaction and knowledge of 
the context in which the conflict is occurring.  These interactions introduce rela-
tionships that could bias third parties in the performance of their role.  Thus, the 
engagement required to reduce structural bias in the process produces risks of 
interpersonal bias in the third party. 
The CCR example shows the promise of a structural solution to this apparent 
dilemma.  Bias is reduced through institutional design: first, by assuring the inde-
pendence of the decision maker from the control of any particular interest; second, 
by creating ongoing critical inquiry from the perspective of multiple participants 
and points of view; and third, by building in forms of accountability to those mul-
tiple participants, rather than to any one position.  Bias is checked by institutional-
izing multi-partiality.  Bias is acknowledged as inevitable and as something that 
must be surfaced and corrected.184  Reflective practice, introducing an interdisci-
plinary perspective, provides one such check.  This process builds in destabiliza-
tion of a fixed or predetermined point of view.  The reflective inquiry calls upon 
participants to explain their understanding and strategy for each case.  They are 
routinely questioned about their strategies and roles.  The concern for bias is an 
explicit part of this inquiry.  This approach resembles the de-biasing idea, devel-
oped by Jolls and Sunstein as an intervention for companies.185  It acknowledges 
that conflict resolvers are affected by the process they facilitate, and thus it is 
important to build checks against the expression of bias into that process. 
Root cause analysis provides another method for assuring full and meaningful 
participation in the conflict resolution process.  This method interrogates problems 
by involving those directly affected in identifying the points of breakdown and 
possible remediation.  Its logic requires substantive participation in analysis and 
intervention by those with knowledge of the problem.  This methodology induces 
intermediaries to pay careful attention to how they frame their intervention, and to 
question assumptions in relation to the views of others and the consequences of 
acting on them. 
___________________________  
 183. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term--Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 10, 11-14 (1987); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for 
our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1881-83 (1988). 
 184. Cf. Sturm, Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 96, at 257, 288-91 (describing the importance of 
developing institutional mindfulness as a way of reducing bias).  
 185. Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 969, 976 (2006). 
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Finally, the intermediary role may be defined to build in accountability to 
multiple constituencies.  Voluntary party participation performs this function.  The 
intermediarys legitimacy and efficacy depends upon the willingness of all af-
fected parties to participate in the root cause inquiry, which in turn provides a 
strong incentive to adopt a stance of independence and institutionalize a practice 
of legitimacy. 
By institutionalizing multi-partiality, this approach enables the type of inter-
action that is crucial in linking individual and systemic interventions, while pro-
tecting against the expression of bias.  This concept has applicability in both the 
judicial and non-judicial arena.  It could help design ways to hold judges account-
able for their non-adjudicative roles within litigation, such as overseeing discov-
ery, promoting settlement, and designing remedies.  It also provides a framework 
for evaluating the legitimacy of embedded conflict resolution systems.  This 
analysis is another example of how the meaning of rule-of-law values can best be 
constructed in particular contexts.  It also shows that understandings developed 
within informal conflict resolution can be instructive for the design of formal 
process. 
VI.  ADDRESSING THE TENSIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SYSTEMIC 
WORK 
It is important to acknowledge and address the constraints and tensions that 
accompany the linkage of individual and systemic work.  On the surface, confi-
dentiality seems like an enormous limitation on systemic work.  Many conflict 
resolution professionals make an ethical commitment to maintain confidentiality, 
which means that a case cannot be discussed in ways that would reveal the iden-
tity of the clients without their permission.186  The intermediary may only use 
information that is not identifiable to an individual, unless the parties agree.  The 
intermediary may not initiate a systemic intervention if doing so would run the 
risk of revealing the person bringing up the issue.  Intermediaries must get permis-
sion from the person raising the issue before involving any additional parties in 
addressing the conflict.  Autonomy constraints also limit when intermediaries can 
proceed with systemic issues.  Many people prefer to handle things on their own; 
they just want a little coaching.  They are seeking perspective and suggestions 
from someone who is not involved directly in the dispute but knows enough to be 
helpful. 
Confidentiality does not in fact operate as an insurmountable constraint on 
systemic work.  First, there are ways to maintain confidentiality and still address 
patterns or problems at a more systemic level.  Part of the intervention can include 
taking steps to minimize the risk of adverse action stemming from raising the 
issue.  Many of the people who come to the office do so because they are offered 
confidentiality.  They are concerned about the consequences of disclosurethat 
someone whose opinion matters will know they have raised an issue, and that 
raising the issue would trigger negative responses.  Managing the consequences of 
disclosure changes the calculus of confidentiality. For example, an individual 
came to CCR with a problem that no other person in the lab was in a position to 
___________________________  
 186. See ABA Standards, supra note 6, at 4. 
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raise.  Together with the concerned individual, CCR devised a way of raising the 
issue in a form that would not lead to her identification.  More importantly, when 
individuals see the possibility of constructive intervention designed to address 
their concerns, most individuals are comfortable having their issue raised with at 
least some people. 
Second, confidentiality brings with it some advantages for connecting indi-
vidual and systemic work.  The promise of confidentiality reduces the risks asso-
ciated with surfacing a problem within the workplace.  It also provides a space for 
brainstorming and taking risks, at a point when it is easy to backtrack, revise, and 
correct misunderstandings.  It enables people to take responsibility for acting.  It 
allows all of the parties to speak openly and honestly about a situation than they 
might in a formal proceeding, where there could be unanticipated consequences of 
acknowledging mistakes, errors, or vulnerabilities.  People often resist admitting 
errors when they could be exposed publicly before they can take remedial steps.  
They may wind up defending a whole system they want to change to keep from 
revealing those mistakes.  Also, some kinds of information needed to bring about 
change will only be revealed if there is some control over who will have access to 
that information.  This includes information about the dynamics that are sustaining 
a systemically problematic situation, which are often partly interpersonal or politi-
cal.  To address problems, it is sometimes important to understand the history and 
politics explaining why a structure is in placefor example, to serve personal 
ends.  Confidentiality also enables systemic work to take place within subunits of 
an organization that may be unwilling to tackle problems if doing so invites scru-
tiny or criticism from those above them.  Cumulative change at the subunit level 
may produce fertile ground for system-wide change. 
Third, data can be aggregated and shared without revealing the identity of in-
dividuals.  There are general points that can be drawn from the particulars, with-
out making explicit reference to them.  The intermediary can compose a hypo-
thetical case that is a composite of cases, which captures the essential pieces and 
dynamic of the conflict.  Information drawing on the lessons of the confidential 
cases can be presented without breaching confidentiality.  Also, reflective prac-
ticeongoing discussion among a group of people bound by confidentiality
serves as a way to pool information without disclosing that information publicly.  
Confidentiality around data retention and tracking is, however, a constraint.  It 
currently prevents the office from performing a systematic analysis of data, and 
from detecting problems that fall outside predetermined or entrenched analytical 
categories. 
It is also important to acknowledge conflict resolutions limitations as a trig-
ger for systemic change.  Conflict resolvers are constrained by their obligation to 
address a problems individual dimensions.  The parties control over the scope 
and focus of the intervention remains paramount.  In the short run, this means that 
individual dimensions must take priority and may trump the decision to address 
longer term, systemic issues.  In addition, there is a tendency to conceptualize 
cases at the individual level.  The emotional valence of a case is gripping and 
insistent, making it difficult to avoid concentrating on the compelling character of 
the human drama in a particular instance. 
In addition, the type of information obtained through conflict resolution is 
skewed.  Conflict resolvers only see the problems that people are unable to resolve 
without outside intervention and are willing to raise.  Problems that people do not 
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see, or are not raised, will not emerge through conflict resolution.  Nor does indi-
vidual conflict resolution prompt the gathering of systematic information across 
settings, unless the problem and the intervention have been reframed at a systemic 
level.  Systemic interventions, such as task forces or deliberative bodies gathering 
and evaluating data about particular aspects of practice, could, however, emerge 
from or proceed in conjunction with conflict resolution. 
A corollary of the repeat player phenomenon also raises potential problems.  
A good working relationship with repeat players complicates the conflict resolu-
tion process when there is a complaint about one of them.  There are, however, 
ways of minimizing this problem.  For example, CCR staff members do not so-
cialize with anyone in a position to come to the office with a problem.  A group 
practice provides another way out of individual conflict situations.  There are 
instances in which a particular ombudsman will ask someone else to take a case if 
it poses risks of bias or conflicts of interest.  Reflective practice also provides a 
check on the expression of bias over time. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This article shows that the prevailing assumptions that frame the ADR debate 
are neither universally true nor endemic to informal conflict resolution.  Contrary 
to the assumptions underlying the scholarly and practitioner debate, individual 
conflict resolution can produce systemic change, and in the process, generate in-
stitutional practices advancing public values and addressing issues of common 
concern.  This article documents an internal conflict resolution process that both 
resolves individual, private disputes and generates systemic solutions and public 
norms.  It can do this in a manner that is principled, generalizable, and account-
able.  Building these values into informal conflict resolution also improves those 
processes efficacy and legitimacy.  Embedded conflict resolution, when struc-
tured to produce critical inquiry, accountability, and independence, enhances the 
capacity to produce effective individual outcomes as part of a long term process of 
generating systemic improvements and norms. 
The process of writing this article together has transformed the way each of 
the authors thinks about conflict resolution and its relationship to law.  It has pro-
vided Howard with critical frameworks enabling his office to evaluate and im-
prove their practice.  It has infused Susans theoretical stance with methods and 
examples that both validate and destabilize that framework.  The resulting analysis 
hopefully provides useful tools to those engaged in conflict resolution, either as 
third parties or as participants.  Also, this article attempts to move the conflict 
resolution debate beyond the stalemate between advocates and critics of ADR.  
The choice is not either/or, or once-and-for-all, but when, under what circum-
stances, and how best to mediate the relationship between individual and systemic 
conflict resolution.  This approach provides conceptual frameworks for evaluating 
the legitimacy of informal processes, and for designing accountability mecha-
nisms that can work within the relevant context. 
This analysis offers a way to broaden and deepen the discussion of laws rela-
tionship to the promotion of public values.  Law is not limited to formal norm 
elaboration through articulating general rules enforceable by state coercion.  It is 
also about creating systems that foster the capacity of actors in different settings to 
identify, generate, and revise norms, and to structure systems that are more likely 
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to produce desired conditions and practices.  It involves engaging with the prac-
tices that encourage or undermine values we care about.  Public values are thus 
embedded in an institutional understanding and analysis.  Only through realizing 
norms in institutional practice can we give concrete meaning to Robert Covers 
profound articulation of the role of law:  To live in a legal world requires that one 
know not only the precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible 
states of affairs.  It requires that one integrate not only the is and the ought, but 
the is, the ought, and the what might be.187 
___________________________  
 187. Cover, supra note 163, at 10. 
